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ABSTRACT 
 
While demographers have focused on sexuality issues mainly in Western nations and 
some in Asia, research that explores sexuality issues in the Middle East remains extremely 
limited. My dissertation explores public attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkey, and how it is 
influenced by demographic and politico-religious values. Drawing from second demographic 
transition theory and the theory of mobilization of political Islam, I address the following 
research questions: What are the public attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkey? How is 
tolerance toward homosexuality in Turkey influenced by demographic trends? How does 
politico-religiosity in Turkey influence the acceptance of homosexual relationships?  Which one 
(demographic attitudes or politico-religious attitudes) has more explanatory power, explaining 
attitudes toward homosexuality? 
There has been a reversal in trends regarding homosexuality in most Western societies. 
However, the tolerance of homosexuality has been stagnant in contemporary Turkey. Using the 
data from the World Values Survey, my regression results show that demographic values, 
consistent with the second demographic transition theory, are positively associated with 
tolerance of homosexuality. More specifically, the justification of abortion variable increases 
tolerant views of homosexuality in both 1990 and 2011 while both justification of divorce and 
importance of family are significant predictors for justification of homosexuality only in 2011.   
In line with the literature on political Islam, I found that an increase in politico-religious 
values is associated with less tolerant views of homosexuality. More specifically, importance of 
God significantly reduces justification of homosexuality in both 1990 and 2011 and tolerance 
toward homosexual neighbors in 1990. While not significant in 1990, the variable left/ right scale 
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becomes a significant determinant of attitudes toward homosexuality in 2011. The variable 
importance of religion was also shown to be a significant predictor of justification of 
homosexuality in 2011. In addition, attendance at religious services was shown to significantly 
decrease the justification of homosexuality in 1990, but not in 2011. Lastly, I found the politico-
religious model has greater power than demographic attitudes, explaining attitudes toward 
homosexual neighbors in 2011. On the other hand, the demography model has greater power 
than the politico-religious model, explaining justification of homosexuality both in 1990 and 
2011. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Making the Familiar Strange 
 
I begin the first chapter of this dissertation with a discussion about me and how and why I 
became interested in the topic I am pursuing.  I grew up in Turkey, a country with a culture that 
is often considered to be caught in between two sets of values because of its unique geographic 
position. Serving as a bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkish culture is greatly influenced by 
both European values and Muslim Middle Eastern values. This cultural “in-betweenness” has 
greatly shaped my research interests.  
Over the course of my undergraduate and graduate training in sociology and demography, I 
developed a sociological imagination by connecting my biographical experiences with public 
issues (Mills 1959). Recognizing the interconnectedness between biography and social structure, 
observing and experiencing the world through sociological lenses was unavoidable. Working 
within the frameworks of gender, sexuality, and demography, I became inquisitive about how 
these perspectives might be applied to my own country. I particularly developed an interest in 
studying structural gender and sexuality issues in Turkey because these issues impact me 
personally as a Turkish woman. My dissertation is a demographic analysis of attitudes toward 
same-sex sexuality in Turkey; it emerged from sociological thinking that links the personal 
troubles with public issues. 
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1.2. Significance and Contribution 
 
The treatment of women and sexual minorities in Muslim societies has become an 
increasingly important issue over the past decade, and has generated a great deal of international 
attention. Scholars and politicians often portray Turkey as a “model” for the Middle East because 
Islam, secular democracy, globalization, and modernity all seem to coexist in Turkey. However, 
women’s rights, gender, and sexuality issues are still highly contested. Global reports document 
that significant gender and sexuality inequality still persists in the fields of education, 
employment, and politics in Turkey.  Violence against women as well as against lesbians, gay 
males, bisexuals, and transgender individuals continues to be a disconcerting social problem.  
My growing concern regarding these issues has had significant impact on my research 
interests. I was inspired to conduct my Master’s thesis research on the entrenched and persisting 
gender inequality in Turkish society.  Working within the areas of gender and sexuality, my MA 
thesis focused on the institutional discrimination that LGBT individuals experienced in general, 
and the individual discrimination and violence transgender individuals experienced in particular. 
Through my research, I discovered that hetero-normativity is deeply ingrained in Turkey’s social 
institutions. My findings highlighted that, at the macro-level, the Turkish legal system fails to 
address the needs of the LGBT population because it does not prohibit discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender expression. At the micro-level, transgender individuals are often 
subjugated to extreme forms of physical, sexual, and verbal violence and denied a safe working 
environment because of their gender identity (Engin 2015). 
We do not know the exact scale of discrimination and violence that LGBT individuals 
experience in Turkey. One of the reasons is that because once LGBT individuals identify 
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themselves publicly, they quickly learn that their safety is greatly compromised (Bakacak and 
Oktem 2013; Engin 2015). Thus, research on sexual minorities in Turkey is very limited. The 
very limited research on same-sex relationships that has been conducted in Turkey has tended to 
involve qualitative inquiries using snowball sampling methods, mainly because sexual minorities 
are often hidden among hard to reach populations (see Bakacak and Oktem 2013, Basaran 2015; 
Çırakoğlu 2006, Engin 2015; Gelbal and Duyan 2006; Ozyegin 2012; Sakallı 2002). The 
qualitative inquiries cited above show that both individual violence and institutional 
discrimination are commonly experienced by LGBT individuals.  
Furthermore, even though same-sex relationships are not banned by law in Turkey, 
LGBT status is generally viewed as an abnormal behavior; moreover, there are no anti-
discrimination laws that protect the rights of LGBT individuals (Bakacak and Oktem; Engin 
2015; Dagoglu 2013). Thus, it is incumbent on the Turkish government to adopt policy 
recommendations that address the needs and safeguard the rights of sexual minorities and non-
normative gender identities. My dissertation proposes policy recommendations that could be 
used to ameliorate the status of LGBT individuals in Turkey. One of the major contributions of 
my dissertation, I believe, is its policy importance.  
Other major contributions of my dissertation to the field of demography and sexuality are 
its regional and methodological significance. An increasing number of demographers have been 
paying attention to demographic analysis of sexuality in Western societies, particularly with 
regard to prevalence of sexual behavior, desires, and identities and their connections with 
demographic processes, especially for the last decade.  The research on this topic (see Baumle 
2013, Baumle and Compton 2015, Baumle and Poston 2011, Baumle et al. 2009, Compton et al. 
2015, Laumann et al. 1994, Parish et al. 2003, Poston and Chang 2015) shows that demographic 
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processes, such as fertility, morbidity, and other areas, are greatly influenced by sexuality. While 
demographers have focused on sexuality issues mainly in Western nations and some in Asia, 
research that explores sexuality issues in the Middle East remains extremely limited. My 
dissertation fills this regional gap in the literature by examining attitudes toward homosexuality 
in Turkey.  
Moreover, as previously mentioned, quantitative research on sexual minorities in Turkey 
is almost non-existent. This is also because there are no nationally representative datasets that 
track the sexual behavior of Turkish individuals. A handful of studies (see Aras et al. 2007; Cok 
et al. 2001; Essizoglu et al. 2011; Saracoglu et al. 2014) have been conducted on Turkish 
university students with non-probability sampling methods, and thus cannot be generalized to the 
whole population. Although these studies cannot be generalized to the population, they do 
provide insightful information on sexual behavior in Turkey. This research on young people 
shows that sexual behavior does occur among young individuals. However, sex before marriage, 
homosexuality, and cohabitation are still considered to be taboo and are stigmatized in society, 
especially for women. There is still a great deal we do not know about the prevalence of sexual 
preferences and experiences in Turkey, including the number of sex partners, sexual networks, 
forced sex, and same-sex sexual relationships.  Attitudes toward sexual behaviors in general and 
non-normative sexualities in particular also remain understudied.  
As a mixed-methods researcher, I incorporate both qualitative and quantitative methods 
in my research. Due to the lack of nationally representative data on sexual minorities, I decided 
to pursue a quantitative analysis of sexuality issues in my dissertation. By undertaking a 
demographic examination of attitudes toward homosexual relationships in Turkish society, I 
hope to demonstrate that sexuality issues do not influence only a small group of people, but 
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sexual minorities as a whole.  Thus, another major contribution of my dissertation is this 
methodological contribution to the field of sexuality.  
In my dissertation, I examine attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkey. While same-sex 
sexual behaviors have been prevalent for centuries across many societies, both Western and non-
Western, the term “homosexuality” emerged only in 19th century Europe. The term 
“homosexuality”, in the Western context, was used to imply a distinct “species” and a deviant 
identity that needs to be fixed and or regulated in opposition to heterosexuality (Foucault 1976). 
We should note that the Western concept of homosexuality is not fully representative of same-
sex desire and behavior in Islamic societies. The Islamic understanding of homosexuality is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
An essentialist approach to sexuality dominated the Western understanding of 
homosexuality in the 19th century, promoting the binary categories of sexuality. The essentialist 
framework propounds sexuality as a natural, inevitable, and a biologically determined 
characteristic, in which individuals are born into the categories of either homosexual or 
heterosexual. In opposition to essentialism, pioneers in social constructionism such as Alfred 
Kinsey, Michael Foucault, and John H. Gagnon challenged the essentialist approach, arguing that 
sex and sexuality are not fixed and natural characteristics. Problematizing normative categories 
of sexuality, social constructivism exemplifies sexuality as a spectrum rather than as a binary.  
The development of the social-constructivist framework was ground-breaking for 
sexuality studies. In particular, Alfred Kinsey’s (1948, 1953) famous books, Sexual Behavior in 
the Human Male and Sexual Behavior in the Human Female were revolutionary for its time. 
Kinsey showed that human sexuality influenced both cultural and social values; his research 
changed the way people viewed sex not just in the U.S but also internationally. Although Kinsey 
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was criticized for his non-random methods of data collection, his work engendered the 
systematic study of human sexuality and facilitated the normalization of sexuality issues, 
including same-sex sexuality, particularly in Western societies.  
Similar to the prevalence of homosexuality, the social tolerance of same-sex relationships 
has varied greatly among various cultures throughout history. Human rights violations and 
discrimination against sexual minorities are not just well-documented and widespread in Middle 
Eastern societies but also in Western ones (Dalacoura 2014). Nevertheless, the contemporary 
acceptance of homosexuality is much greater in North America and in Europe than in the Middle 
East and North Africa (Pew Research Institute 2013). While we know that tolerance toward 
homosexuality generally is high in Western societies and is low in non-Western ones, an 
important question still remains unanswered: what leads to tolerance or intolerance of 
homosexuality?  My dissertation explores two possible determinants of tolerance of 
homosexuality: demographic values and politico-religious values. 
I investigate public attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkish society and how it is 
influenced by demographic and politico-religious values. As I previously mentioned, Turkey 
presents a unique case as a democratic state with a predominantly Muslim population because it 
has been influenced by both modern Western and traditional Islamic values. In my dissertation, I 
address four research questions. First, what are the public attitudes toward homosexuality in 
Turkey? Second, is tolerance toward homosexuality in Turkey influenced by demographic 
values? Third, do politico-religious values in Turkey influence the acceptance of homosexual 
relationships? Lastly, which of the two sets of issues and perspectives (demographic attitudes or 
politico-religious attitudes) has the most power with regard to explaining attitudes toward same-
sex relationships? 
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Using data from two waves (1990 and 2011) of the World Values Survey (WVS), I 
ascertain the degree to which attitudes toward homosexuality are influenced by both 
demographic values and politico-religious values in Turkey. I test two competing main 
hypotheses and one comparative hypothesis, supported by the second demographic transition 
theory and the theory of mobilization of political Islam. I argue that as Turkish individuals’ level 
of demographic attitudes increases (owing to the effects of an increase in both the justification of 
abortion, and the justification of divorce, and a decrease in both the importance of family and the 
level of nationalism), they are more likely to report tolerant values toward homosexuality. I draw 
from demographic attitudes consistent with the second demographic transition theory (SDT) to 
explain and better understand this hypothesized relationship.  
The SDT informs us that as countries progress in their demographic transition, they also 
experience a shift in societal values, which is associated with changes in family structure. I am 
especially concerned here with both the prevalence and acceptance of non-normative family 
structures, such as cohabitation, divorce, same-sex relationships, children out of wedlock, and 
voluntary childlessness. The second demographic transition is also associated with greater 
tolerance toward sexual, religious, and racial minorities (Van de Kaa 1987, 2002; Lesthaeghe 
1995, 2010; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006, 2009). In other words, as countries progress in their 
demographic transition, they also become more tolerant toward the behavior of others. 
Alternatively, I posit that Turkish individuals who report high levels of politico-religious 
values (an increase in political conservatism, attendance to religious services, importance of 
God, and importance of religion) are less likely to express tolerant views toward homosexuality. 
To provide a perspective for this hypothesis, I draw from the rich literature on the mobilization 
of political Islam. Since the early 2000s, the Turkish government has followed an Islamic agenda 
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that aims to weaken democracy. More specifically, there has been a decreasing respect for 
political rights, civil liberties, and minority rights in Turkey (Freedom House 2018). In line with 
the upsurge in Islamic values in Turkey since the 2000s, I also expect politico-religious values to 
have a stronger effect on attitudes toward same-sex relationships than on demographic attitudes. 
Examining the attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkey and how they are influenced by 
demographic values and politico-religious values, I hope that my dissertation will contribute to 
both demography and sexuality studies.  
 
1.3. Dissertation Structure 
 
In Chapter I, I introduced the significance and contribution of my dissertation and presented 
the development of my research interests in gender and sexuality issues in Turkey. Chapter II 
consists of three sections. First, I review the historical and contemporary literature on same-sex 
sexuality in Turkey. I then discuss the theories of demographic transition, and how they apply in 
the context of Turkey. Lastly, I provide a historical background of Turkey’s political climate 
since its establishment, and demonstrate how political Islam has remained an active force in the 
country’s social institutions. In this chapter, I also introduce my hypotheses that emerged from 
the second demographic transition theory and the theory of mobilization of political Islam. In 
Chapter III, I describe the data, sampling, operationalization of variables, and methods I used to 
test my hypotheses. In Chapter IV, I present my data analyses and findings. Lastly, in Chapter V, 
I summarize my findings and discuss some of the implications of my research. In this chapter I 
also discuss some of the limitations of my research. Finally, I end my dissertation by outlining 
my future research agenda in this area. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review of my dissertation has three sections. In the first section, I review 
the literature analyzing same-sex sexuality in Turkish culture. Literature indicates that before the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, same-sex love and homo-eroticism were commonplace 
and accepted among the Turkic people, especially during the Ottoman Empire. However, this 
tolerance has been reduced since the start of 19th century, mainly in order to improve 
relationships with Western societies (Murray 2007; Ze’evi 2006). While in Western societies 
homosexuality has become more accepted as part of the culture, contemporary research on 
sexuality demonstrates that Turkey does not follow the European pattern of tolerance regarding 
same-sex sexuality. That is, the acceptance of homosexuality remains low in contemporary 
Turkey.  
In the second section of my literature review, I discuss the theories of demographic 
transition (classical demographic transition theory and the second demographic transition theory) 
and how they apply in the context of Turkey. I show how and explain why the processes in the 
second demographic transition are associated with greater liberal sexual values. In the third 
section of my literature review, I present a background analysis on Turkey and the changes in its 
political system since its establishment as a secular democracy in 1923. More specifically, I 
discuss the increasing mobilization of political Islam and how Islam has remained an active force 
in Turkish culture, ingrained in most of the country’s social institutions. I point out that a rise in 
politico- religious values may be the driving force behind the low tolerance toward homosexual 
relationships. 
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2.1. Homosexuality: From Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic 
 
 
In regard to sexuality and sexual identity, I need to note that the interpretation of 
homosexuality greatly differs across cultures and time. “Homosexuality” is a Western term, 
coined in the 19th century, leading individuals to identify not only in accordance with their 
gender, but also with their sexual identity (Sedgewick 1990). According to Foucault (1976), this 
was the emergence of homosexuality as a “distinct species,” which led to the consideration of 
homosexuality as a disease, or a disorder that needed to be suppressed and regulated. 
Accordingly, the term heterosexuality was conceptualized in opposition to homosexuality, 
emphasizing those who do not have the traits of a homosexual. Kristeva’s (1982) notion of the 
abject explains this phenomenon: one is part of the whole while being excluded from it. In other 
words, one is a heterosexual because he or she is not a homosexual.  
Even though the term homosexuality is a 19th century Western construct, same sex 
desires were present before their social definitions (Bilancetti 2011). Thus, the concept of 
homosexuality in the Western sense is not representative of the historic conceptualization and 
practice of same-sex desire and sexuality in Islamic cultures (Jamal 2001). Contemporary 
attitudes towards homosexuality differ greatly from the Lot’s people.  In this case, the 
terminology of homo-eroticism or same-sex love is more applicable to the Islamic understating 
of homosexuality (Jamal 2001).   
Same-sex relationships (in the form of homo-eroticism, sodomy, and same-sex love) 
were evident were commonplace and accepted both in Medieval Islamic societies and among the 
Turkic people. (Daniyal 2016). A historical review of same-sex love in the Islamic world shows 
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that during the Islamic Golden Age (between the mid-8th century and the 13th century), 
homosexual desires and relations were commonplace and accepted in many Muslim societies. 
For instance, Abu Nuwas (756- 816), a well-known Arab poet, wrote publicly about same sex 
desire and relations. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (971- 1030) was also known for openly speaking 
about his love for another man (Daniyal 2016).  In fact, the punishment of homosexual 
relationships in Medieval Muslim societies was rare compared to the situation in Medieval 
Europe (Daniyal 2016).  
Same-sex love and desire were also present in the Ottoman culture. The Ottoman Empire 
was established in the late 13th century and lasted until it was replaced by the secular Turkish 
Republic in 1923.  The Ottomans ruled the Middle East and North Africa region under one 
sultan. The sultan was not only the head of the state, but was also considered the protector of 
Islam (BBC 2014). Homoerotic relationships in the Ottoman empire presents an illuminating 
picture for understanding the presence of same-sex relationships in the Muslim world in general 
and later in Turkish society, in particular. Although research is certainly needed on same-sex 
relations during the Ottoman era, records indicate that homosexual relationships during this 
period in the form of homo-eroticism, sodomy, and same-sex love were evident (Murray 2007; 
Ze’evi 2006). 
Murray (2007) has noted that that pederasty was practiced in which young boys were 
exclusively occupied in sodomy, beginning from the early 14th century.  Also, Murray (2007) 
points out that it was common for parents to groom their sons for sexual service for the rulers.  It 
was believed that boys lost their attractiveness once they grew body and facial hair.  However, 
after examining Ottoman literature, poetry, and art, Murray (2007) concludes that homo-erotic 
relationships were common even after the conventional age line.  
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The first coffee houses opened in the early 16th century and became a common location 
for homoerotic relationships (Murray 2007). Furthermore, Western historians and scholars also 
acknowledge that when young male servants were engaged in training to become public officials, 
sexual relationships often took place between them and their masters (Lybyer 1913; Busbecq 
1927; Ricaut 1971).  Although very limited, research that is available on same-sex relations in 
the Ottoman culture indicates that homosexuality was not considered taboo.  It was a common 
discourse in the culture and was not thought of as a perversion.  Ottomans were tolerant of 
homo-erotic relationships as well as prostitution.  In fact, brothels remain legal even in today’s 
Turkey.   
It should be noted, however, that the evidence cited here solely focuses on male same-sex 
relationships.  Some report that female homosexuality was common in the Ottoman harem and in 
Turkish baths; however, these reports are from personal commentaries and remain speculative 
(Murray 2007).  According to Habib (2007) female homosexuality is scarcely mentioned in the 
literature but has been more tolerated than male homosexuality. This is likely because Islamist 
jurists do not categorize sexual acts between two women as actual sex acts since they do not 
involve penile penetration.  
The Islamic laws that punish homosexuality and adultery in a cruel manner in 
contemporary Islamic societies were not evident during the Ottoman era until the 19th century.  
According to Dror Ze’evi (2006), the relationship with the West engendered the condemnation of 
same-sex relationships.  As a result, during the 19th and 20th centuries, homo-erotic relations 
were silenced, and heteronormativity was reinforced.  Turks and Arabs were blamed for 
pederasty, homosexuality, and for being feminine.  Dror Zv’evi (2006) posits that those who 
practiced homosexuality were put to death in order to improve relations with the West.  
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The silencing of homosexuality can be understood through one of Foucault’s most 
influential works, The History of Sexuality.  Foucault (1976) focuses on how power, culture, and 
society play crucial roles in the construction and regulation of sexuality.  He shows that the era 
before the 17th century was one in which people openly and transparently discussed erotic acts 
and desires in public spaces without the shaming of bodies.  After the 17th century, sexual 
relations were confined and certain norms were enforced to keep sexuality private and restricted 
to the conjugal family.  Sexual behavior outside the conjugal family became labeled as abnormal 
or deviant, while sexual discourse was nonexistent.  However, when examined closely, Foucault 
illustrates that this discourse on sex was an integral part of the religious, scientific, and political 
community of the Western world despite its supposed repression prior to the 20th century.   
Foucault explains the relationship between sex, power, and repression by stating that, 
when “sex is repressed, and it is condemned to prohibition, non-existence, and silence, then the 
mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression.  A person 
who holds forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; 
he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom” (Foucault 1976: 6).  
With the rise of industrialization and capitalism, same-sex relationships were also demonized 
because of their non-reproductive nature.  The homophobic Western attitudes of the 18th century 
reached the Ottoman culture two centuries later. These attitudes were then carried over to Turkish 
society. 
The ways in which Western and non-Western nations treat LGBT individuals vary 
significantly. The social tolerance of LGBT individuals in the West is a recent phenomenon, and 
homophobia remains pervasive. Nevertheless, sexuality and gender discrimination laws have 
made significant improvements in North America and Europe in the last decade (Dalacoura 
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2014). Compared to Western societies, inequality, discrimination, and violence against LGBT 
individuals in non-Western societies are widespread and are still prominent (Dalacoura 2014).  
According to the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA), 
there are currently 79 countries with laws against the sexual activity of LGBT individuals. 
Among the 79 countries that criminalize homosexuality, 59 are located in the Middle East and 
North Africa region (Itaborahy and Zhu 2014).   
The punishment for homosexual activity often includes fines, imprisonment, long and 
short-term jail sentences, banishment, whippings, the death penalty, and public stoning, 
depending on the region. The countries where homosexuality may be punished with death 
include Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, 
Mauritania, and Somalia (Bearak and Cameron 2016).  Although Turkey is not on this list 
because there are no laws in Turkey that explicitly ban same-sex relationships and non-
normative gender identities, there have been numerous instances in Turkey where LGBT 
individuals have been subjected to discrimination and violence from the police and people with 
low tolerance (Engin 2015; ILGA 2017). According to the ILGA-Europe Rainbow Index (2017), 
Turkey was ranked 46th out of the 49 European counties with respect to the national legal and 
policy human rights of LGBTI individuals. The only countries with scores lower than Turkey’s 
were Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan (ILGA 2016). 
Although homosexuality is not banned in Turkish society, the government does not have 
antidiscrimination laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity.  As a result, gender inequality, discrimination, and violence experienced by LGBT 
individuals remain institutionalized problems (Engin 2015). Data about the numbers of sexual 
minorities in Turkey are very limited and hard to access, especially because once LGBT 
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individuals come out, their rights are greatly compromised.  A secondary analysis I conducted in 
2014 shows that transgender individuals regularly experience verbal, emotional, and physical 
abuse in addition to experiencing discrimination in employment, housing, and health care (Engin 
2015).  According to Transgender Europe (2013), 34 transgender individuals have been murdered 
in Turkey since 2008, a number higher than in any other European country.   
There is a global divide regarding attitudes toward homosexuality. Acceptance of same-
sex relationships varies extensively by region and time. Although discriminatory practices 
against sexual minorities are not exclusive to Middle Eastern societies, homosexuality is mostly 
accepted in North America, Europe, and much of Latin America as well as in Australia, the 
Philippines, and Japan (Pew Research Institute 2013). On the other hand, same sex relations are 
predominantly rejected in Africa and in the Middle East. In eight of the 39 countries that were 
surveyed in 2013, the acceptance of homosexuality has decreased since a prior study conducted 
in 2007.  These countries include Ghana, the Czech Republic, Poland, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, 
the Palestinian Territories, and France. In Turkey in 2007, while 14 percent of the public agreed 
that homosexuality should be accepted, the acceptance rate had declined to 9 percent by 2013.  
Interestingly, homosexuality was more accepted among the older generation (50 years of age or 
older) than among the younger generation in Turkey. On the contrary, the older generation in 
general was less tolerant than the younger generation in other countries.  
Another study conducted on attitudes toward homosexuality among 27 European 
countries finds that most European citizens do not support discriminatory practices against 
sexual minorities (Gerharts 2010). Gerharts (2010) also demonstrates that modernization 
increases tolerance toward homosexuality while church attendance and being Muslim, Protestant, 
or Orthodox decreases such tolerance. Other studies (Adamzyle and Pitt 2009; Schulte and Battle 
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2004; Guittar and Pals 2014) also confirm religion’s negative impact on tolerance toward gays 
and lesbians.  
Qualitative inquiries about sexual minorities in Turkey demonstrate the discrimination 
and violence LGBT individuals face as a result of living in a hetero-normative culture that 
marginalizes them (Bakacak and Oktem 2013, Basaran 2015; Çırakoğlu 2006, Engin 2015; 
Gelbal and Duyan 2006; Ozyegin 2012; Sakallı 2002). In addition to discrimination and 
violence, high suicide rates of members of the LGBT population persist as a result of low 
tolerance in the Turkish community.  Moreover, the Turkish military administration finds 
homosexual individuals’ participation in military service unfit (Basaran 2015; Azizlerli 2013). 
The military performs inspections in the form of psychological testing, interviews, and rectal 
examination of those who claim to be homosexual. In some cases, these individuals are also 
asked for pictures of themselves participating in gay sex in order to convince the military 
psychologists. Those who convince the military personal of their homosexuality are given a 
“çürük raporu,” an ineligibility report for military service that labels homosexual men as rotten. 
Homosexual men often apply for “çürük raporu” even though they have to go through an abusive 
and humiliating process because they fear experiencing violence during their military service due 
their sexual orientation (Basaran 2015; Azizlerli 2013).  
Turkish political attitudes toward homosexuality are also intolerant. The view of 
homosexuality as a sickness also perseveres in the Turkish parliament.  In 2013, an 
unprecedented gender equality bill that would prevent discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation was discussed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT).  However, this 
bill was overturned by the Turkish government.  Some government representatives justified their 
position by claiming that homosexuality is an abnormal behavior.  For instance, in her 
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parliamentary speech, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) deputy, Turkan Dagoglu (2013), 
stated:  
 
Women marrying women, or men marrying men is not a right.  On the contrary, it 
converts accepted sexual understandings on the path toward the degeneration of society 
(…) Research on this topic has been done previously by both the U.S. in 1972, and by the 
European Psychological Association in 1992. They found that what we consider an 
LGBT status is not a normal behavior. 
   
State representatives justify their discriminatory actions by supporting their arguments with 
outdated “scientific” evidence on sexuality, or religious arguments that label homosexuality as 
immoral.   
The data available on same-sex relationships in Turkey illustrate that tolerance toward 
homosexuality remains stagnant in contemporary Turkish society. However, the second 
demographic transition theory informs us that the opposite should be occurring. That is, we 
should begin to observe increasing tolerance toward non-normative sexual relationships because 
of the influences of the second demographic transition. In the next section of this chapter, I will 
discuss the theories of demographic transition and how they apply to changes in values with 
regard to same-sex relationships.  
 
2.2. The Theories of Demographic Transition 
 
First developed by Warren S. Thompson (1929) and Frank W. Notestein (1945) and 
further developed later by Kingley Davis (1945), demographic transition theory (DTT) is one of 
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the most prominent theories in the field of demography, explaining population change in 
societies. DTT proposes four phases of mortality and fertility change as a result of societal 
modernization. The first stage of the demographic transition is known as the pre-transitional or 
pre-industrialization stage. During this stage, the crude birth rates and crude death rates can be as 
high as 80/1,000 (Poston and Bouvier 2016). The first stage lasted for centuries when both the 
birth and death rates fluctuated regularly; however, the population had a stable growth. Overall, 
the first phase is associated with high rates of fluctuating mortality and high fertility. While there 
is a relative instability of birth and death rates, there is not a significant change in the size of the 
population over a longer period (Poston and Bouvier 2016).  
The second phase of the demographic transition occurs with the reductions in the 
mortality rates. Major factors behind drastic mortality reduction in many societies include 
scientific agriculture, increase in the number of products as a result of the change from home-
handicraft systems to manufacturing, and efficient transportation system that facilitates the 
distribution of goods quickly and efficiently. Other improvements include public sanitation and 
personal hygiene in addition to the development of immunology and other medical 
enhancements. In stage 2, both medical and agricultural development contribute to the fall of 
mortality rates and lead to a rapid increase in population size (Poston and Bouvier 2016).   
Phase 3 of the demographic transition is characterized by declining population growth 
due to reductions in both fertility and mortality. Factors associated with the decrease in fertility 
rates include the increasing development and use of contraceptive methods in addition to a rise in 
the education of women and an increase in the labor force participation of women. Sustained 
reduction in infant mortality, reductions in traditional religious beliefs, which supported high 
fertility norms, as well as urbanization and its “secularizing” influences, also greatly contributed 
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to the fall in fertility (Poston and Bouvier 2016). Lastly, in the final stage of the demographic 
transition (Phase 4), also referred as incipient decline, both fertility and mortality rates are very 
low, stabilizing population growth. In phase 4, population growth only occurs when there are 
increases in fertility (Poston and Bouvier 2016). 
There are numerous applications of the demographic transition theory in both developed 
and developing societies. Countries differ with regard to their demographic changes in fertility 
and mortality. For instance, while most European societies have completed their demographic 
transitions, the demographic transition in less developed societies is not yet complete.  Overall, 
classical demographic transition is associated with initial declines in birth and death rates from 
traditionally high levels of fertility and mortality, as it has been witnessed in industrial societies 
(Van de Kaa 1987, 2010; Lesthaeghe 1995, 2010; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006, 2009). Since 
total fertility rates began falling below the replacement level of 2.1 in Europe, a rate that is much 
lower than was anticipated by demographic transition theory, demographers in Europe in the 
1980s and 1990s, mainly Dirk van de Kaa and Ron Lesthaege, searched for alternative 
explanations for the low fertility rates observed in Europe. They coined the term second 
demographic transition (SDT) theory to explain how other demographic behaviors impact 
fertility.  
These demographers list distinct differences between the first demographic transition 
theory (FDT) and the second demographic transition (SDT) theory. While the initial declines in 
birth and death rates from traditionally high levels of fertility and mortality are associated with 
the first demographic transition (FDT), van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe made the argument that the 
SDT is related to societal changes; these significantly contribute to the transformation of the 
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family. They argue that the evolution in living arrangements and sexual behavior of individuals 
are significant factors explaining low fertility. 
More specifically, improved public health, better nutrition, and lower infant mortality are 
some of the main reasons that explain the falling of death rates in the FDT. In the FDT, marriage 
is still strongly favored while divorce is disfavored. In the FDT, countries experience a decrease 
in divorce rates and declining age at first marriage in addition to an increase in the proportions 
marrying and high rates of remarriage (Lesthaeghe 2010). Socioeconomic growth and 
improvements in material living conditions play a central role in the FDT’s development stage. 
More specifically, an increase in household income, an improvement in housing and working 
conditions, an increase in life expectancy, and the enhancement of human capital in the form of 
education and social security benefits are the major features of the FDT. Social cohesion and 
solidarity also play a prominent role in the FDT. In the FDT, traditional matrimony is especially 
promoted by religious, political, and civic networks. Traditional gender norms in the form of 
gendered divisions of labor are embraced. While husbands are expected to hold breadwinner 
positions, wives usually take the role of housewives within the family (Lesthaeghe 2010). 
In contrast to the first demographic transition, countries experiencing the second 
demographic transition realize a fall in the proportion of the married population, a rise in 
cohabitation, an increase in divorce, and a decline in remarriage. A further decline in fertility 
rates is also observed in the SDT owing to very efficient contraception. Issues of societal 
development in the SDT include a rise in individual autonomy, a weakening of social cohesion, 
an increase in female participation in the workforce, and a sexual revolution in addition to 
increasing tolerance toward the behavior of others.  The second demographic transition is also 
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associated with greater gender, racial, and sexual orientation equality, along with environmental 
rights (van de Kaa 2010; Lesthaeghe 2010).  
 
2.3. Turkey’s Demographic Transition 
 
Similar to Western societies, Turkey is now undergoing demographic changes that have 
characterized much of Europe since the 1980s and 1990s. The country is entering the final stage 
of the demographic transition in which birth and death rates will be low, and the population will 
only be increasing slightly. Turkey is also showing some of the characteristics of the second 
demographic transition such as a decrease in the marriage rate, an increase in divorce, and an 
increase in the average age at first marriage.  
A substantial socio-economic transformation in Turkey’s population has resulted in low 
fertility and low mortality, and proliferating urbanization. Until the 1930s, total fertility rates 
were as high as 7 children per woman, and then they remained stable until the 1950s (Yucesahin 
2009). The total fertility rate (TFR) was recorded as 6.18 in 1960 but dropped to 2.2 children by 
2014, one of the most dramatic and rapid fertility reductions in Europe and West Asia (See 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Total Fertility Rates, Turkey 1960- 2014 
Source: The Global Economy 2017c 
 
 
 
In the 1950s, certain measures were taken to control population increase and high 
fertility. These measures included the decriminalization of abortion, the education of couples 
about the maternal and health benefits of having fewer births, and information and easy access to 
contraceptives. Moreover, an increase in the level of educational attainment of Turkish women 
and their entry into the workforce significantly contributed to the decrease in the crude birth rate 
(CDR) (Yucesahin 2009).  
The CDR decreased from 46 births per 1000 population to 17 per 1000 between 1960 and 
2014 (See Figure 2). Advances in medical technology in the late 20th century also contributed to 
the decline in the death rates. Crude death rates fell from 20 deaths per 1000 population in 1960 
to 5 in 2014 (See Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Crude Birth Rates and Crude Death Rates, Turkey 1960-2014 
Source: The Global Economy 2017a and 2017b. 
 
 
 
 
During this time, the infant mortality rate (IMR) also fell from 200 per 1000 to 40 per 
1000, and the urbanization rate more than tripled. While the urbanization rate was only 20 
percent in the 1950s, the rate increased to 65 percent in the 2000s (Korkmaz 2013). In addition, 
decreasing fertility and mortality rates slowed the rate of natural increase (Yucesahin 2009). 
Although the country of Turkey still is not experiencing natural decrease, i.e., more deaths than 
births, some of Turkey’s counties are experiencing near natural decrease (Marquez-Valerda, 
Engin, and Poston 2017). Marquez-Valerda and colleagues (Forthcoming 2018) predict that 
some of Turkey’s counties are likely to experience natural decrease in the near future. Both low 
fertility and stark increase in population aging are significant predictors of natural decrease in 
Turkey. 
Turkey has also become an older population. In 2017, there were more than 6.9 million 
elderly individuals (defined as persons of age 65 and older) in Turkey. The elderly population 
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increased by 17 percent between 2013 and 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute 2018). In addition 
to cultural influences mainly from Europe, Turkey has also experienced changes in its 
demographic structure, resulting in trends in fertility, mortality, and age composition becoming 
more and more similar to those of many European societies. 
As previously discussed, the second demographic transition theory informs us that as 
countries progress in their demographic transition, they should experience increasing age at first 
marriage, increases in divorce, the emergence of same-sex partnerships and marriages, weaker 
family ties. Moreover, they should also express more tolerance toward the behavior of others, 
including non-normative sexual relationships. Accordingly, I hypothesize that tolerance toward 
homosexuality is directly related to individuals’ demographic attitudes (an increase in both the 
justification of abortion, and the justification of divorce, and a decrease in both the importance of 
family) consistent with the second demographic transition theory. This is the first hypothesis I 
will test in this dissertation.  
Turkey is experiencing some of the characteristics of the second demographic transition 
such as low fertility, low mortality, increase in average age at first marriage, and decrease in 
marriage rate. For instance, marriage rate has been decreasing since 2006 to its lowest record in 
history: 7.09 in 2017 (Turkish Statistical Institute 2018).  Average age at first marriage has been 
steadily increasing for both Turkish men and women as well. However, on average men (29.4 
years) still marry for the first time at later ages when compared to women (24.6 years) (Turkish 
Statistical Institute 2016). 
On the other hand, other features of societal development (tolerance toward diversity and 
behavior of others) have been stagnant in Turkey compared to other Western societies. The 
second demographic transition theory informs us that tolerance toward LGBT individuals should 
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be increasing due to the influences of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe 2010; van 
de Kaa 2002). However, a gender-based division of labor, in addition to discrimination against 
racial, sexual, and religious minorities, are still present in Turkish society (Engin 2015; Kaya 
2015). I propose that the Turkish government’s change in its political systems is crucial to 
understanding why Turkey is falling behind in terms of gender and LGBT equality compared to 
other developed nations. In the next section, I provide a historical background of Turkey, and 
discuss how political conservatism, particularly Islam, has remained an active force in the 
country’s social institutions. I then show how the rise in political Islam tends to influence 
attitudes toward homosexual relationships. This will provide the basis for my second hypothesis.  
 
2.4. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey 
 
Turkish culture is influenced by both Western values and Islamic values because of its 
unique geographic position, located as a bridge between Europe and Asia. After Turkey’s 
establishment in 1923 as a democratically elected government with a predominantly Islamic 
population, the political leaders implemented various economic, political, and social reforms 
(Eligur 2010, Pope and Pope 2011, Saktanber 2002). These reforms aimed to transform the 
country into a secular and modern nation state by removing religion from state affairs. The 
modernization efforts began with abolishing the sultanate and the caliphate and adopting a 
European model of law. The government also implemented secular public education, changed 
the official national language to Turkish, and adopted the Latin alphabet. Moreover, wearing 
religious attire such as headscarves and fezzes were banned in schools and other government 
institutions (Eligur 2010; Pope and Pope 2011; Saktanber 2002). 
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During this time, the Turkish government also took significant measures to improve the 
status of women (Saktanber 2002; Kandiyoti 1987). Under the new European law, polygamy was 
outlawed, and women’s right to divorce and inheritance was granted. Turkish women also 
became eligible to vote and to be elected to public office.  These reforms intended to separate 
religion from the public spheres through state control, infusing Turkish culture with Western 
liberal ideas to create a new type of citizenship and a modern society (Eligur 2010, Pope and 
Pope 2011).  However, the Turkish government’s attempts to remove religion from the public 
spheres were not fully successful. Instead, Islam has remained an integral part of the Turkish 
culture (Saktanber 2002).   
How did the culture of Islam remain an active force in Turkish society?  The 
secularization experiment in Turkey was not a gradual implementation but a drastic one imposed 
by the governing elite.  Thus, the modernization movement was not fully embraced by the 
culture (Kandiyoti 1987).  Meanwhile, political Islamists and those who supported Islamic 
brotherhoods were reduced to marginalized groups as part of the secularization movement.  
However, instead of disappearing, the Islamist groups developed and functioned underground, 
beyond the state’s control.  Islamists networked and manifested covertly, forming charitable 
organizations, foundations, Quran courses, and schools (Eligur 2010). The Islamists were well-
organized and rich in resources, and began to address the government’s dysfunctions.  They 
became more visible in communities and increased their public support.  The Islamist movement 
resulted in the formation of group solidarity in the form of an Islamist collective identity. The 
supporters of the movement formed Islamic political parties and had successors in the local and 
national elections (Eligur 2010; Saktanber 2002). 
 27 
 
There have been several failed attempts to re-establish an Islamic state in Turkey since 
the 1970s.  However, the mobilization of political Islam has been on the rise, especially since the 
1990s (Eligur 2010).  For instance, by mobilizing their collective Islamist identity, Islamists 
managed to form a political party in the 1990s under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan.  In 
1996, he was elected as the prime minister of Turkey, but he only served one year.  As a result of 
his fundamentalist Islamist attitudes and tendencies, he was banned from politics by the Turkish 
judiciary.  Even though Erbakan was prohibited from participating in political affairs, he 
nonetheless served as a mentor and an informal advisor to many Islamist political members.  The 
former prime minister and current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was one of 
Erbakan’s mentees and supporters (Eligur 2010).  Because the existence of state imposed 
democracy had marginalized Islamist groups in the past, contemporary Islamists have been more 
cautious in their actions, pursuing effective strategies to challenge secularism and democracy.  
Perhaps one of the biggest successes of the Islamist Movement was the election in 2002 
of the conservative Justice and Development Party (JDP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan.  Erdogan became the Prime Minister by gaining the majority of the popular vote.  In 
2007, he was reelected by winning 46.6 percent of the votes.  In 2014, he won the presidential 
election becoming Turkey’s 12 th president (Ak Parti 2015).  Since Erdogan has been in office, he 
has followed an Islamic agenda that aims to weaken democracy and secularism (Eligur 2010).   
In 2003, the number of Qur’an courses that provided free accommodation and food for 
economically disadvantaged students was increased.  The government established control over 
the universities, and scholarships were specifically provided to the graduates of Islamic schools, 
also known as imam hatip (Eligur 2010).  Erdogan also appointed imam-hatip graduates and 
Islamic brotherhood members to many high ranking civil service positions.  He took control of 
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the judiciary and ordered the mass arrests and detentions of prominent secular critics of the 
Justice and Development Party.  He also favored the Islamist media and bought popular media 
channels and thereby closed down those who spoke against him.  Under Erdogan’s rule, for the 
past decade there has been a decreasing respect for political rights, civil liberties, and minority 
rights. Turkey has been among the countries with the largest number of imprisoned journalists in 
the world (Eligur 2010). The Turkish academia is also badly crippled because there is a 
significant lack of academic freedom. The Turkish government has been committing “intellectual 
genocide” by dismissing or jailing thousands of academics in an attempt to silence critical voices 
against the government, especially since the failed coup attempt in 2016. 
Moreover, research has shown that women’s status has been gradually deteriorating since 
the election of the Justice and Development Party. The World Bank’s 2012 Gender Equality 
Report reveals that significant gender inequality persists in the fields of education, employment, 
and politics in Turkey. The Report has noted that Turkey is ranked 125th out of 142 countries in 
education. Women’s labor force participation also remains at a mere 29 percent, which is lower 
than any OECD country. Political participation among Turkish women is also significantly low. 
Females currently hold 98 parliamentary seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
(GNAT) compared to 452 seats held by males (TBMM 2015).  
 Although it has been theorized in the past that the influence of religiosity and political 
conservatism undermines women’s status in Turkish society, there is rather limited research that 
empirically tests this hypothesis (see Engin and Pals 2018; Rankin and Aytac 2008; Smits and 
Hosgor 2006). Rankin and Aytac (2008) analyze how educational attainment is influenced by 
parental religiosity. They find that girls’ education was compromised when their families had 
high religiosity and held traditional gender norms. Similarly, Engin and Pals (2018) find that 
 29 
 
both religiosity and political conservatism have a positive and significant effect on patriarchal 
values in Turkey. As individuals’ level of religiosity and political conservatism increases, they 
are more likely to hold economic, political, familial, and educational patriarchal attitudes.  
I argue that if religiosity and political conservatism engender disadvantageous outcomes 
for women, it may also be negatively influencing the status of LGBT individuals. Accordingly, I 
hypothesize that an increase in politico- religious values is inversely related to tolerance toward 
homosexuality. This is the 2nd hypothesis I will test in this dissertation. While the acceptance of 
homosexuality has been increasing dramatically over the past two decades in Western societies, 
the acceptance of homosexuality has been stagnant in Turkey. I argue that this may be due to the 
rise of mobilization of politico-religious values, especially since the 1990s. I also predict that 
politico-religious values may override the influence of the second demographic transition. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that the effects of politico-religious attitudes will be stronger than 
demographic attitudes, explaining tolerance toward homosexuality; this comparative hypothesis 
is my 3rd hypothesis.  
 
2.5. Discussion of Hypotheses 
 
My dissertation tests two main competing hypotheses; one has its basis and rationale in 
second demographic transition theory, and the other is grounded in the literature on mobilization 
of political Islam. First, I posit that demographic attitudes (an increase in both tolerance of 
abortion and divorce, and a decrease in both the importance of family) will vary directly with 
tolerance of homosexuality. Second, I predict that politico-religious values (an increase in 
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politically right values, attendance of religious services, importance of God, and importance of 
religion) will vary inversely with tolerance toward homosexuality.  
Lastly, I will also examine the combined hypothesis that shows whether the effect of 
politico-religious values on homosexuality is greater or lesser than the effect of demographic 
attitudes. I argue that the effect of politico-religious attitudes is stronger than demographic 
attitudes explaining attitudes toward homosexuality. 
 
Demography-Specific Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: As Turkish individuals’ level of demographic attitudes increase, they are 
more likely to report tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality. 
More specifically,  
Hypothesis 1A: As individuals’ level of justification of abortion increases, they are more 
likely to report tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality. 
Hypothesis 1B: As individuals’ level of justification of divorce increases, they are more 
likely to report tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality. 
Hypothesis 1C: Individuals who consider family important in their lives are less likely to 
report tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality.  
Politico-Religiosity Specific Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Turkish individuals who report high levels of politico-religious values are 
less likely to express tolerant views toward homosexuality.  
More Specifically, 
Hypothesis 2A: As individuals’ politically right-wing values increase, they are less likely 
report tolerant views toward homosexuality.  
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Hypothesis 2B: As individuals’ attendance to religious services increases, they are less 
likely to report tolerant views toward homosexuality. 
Hypothesis 2C: An increase in importance of God in individuals’ lives is less likely to 
result in tolerant views toward homosexuality. 
Hypothesis 2D: Individuals who consider religion important in life are less likely to 
report tolerant views toward homosexuality. 
Combined Demographic and Politico-Religious Hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of politico-religious values is greater than the effect of 
demographic attitudes, explaining attitudes toward homosexuality. 
 
In the next chapter, I explicate the data and statistical methods I use to test my hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.1. Data 
 
In this chapter, I discuss in detail the data and methods I will use in my dissertation to 
conduct my investigations.  I first discuss the data. In order to examine changes in attitudes 
toward homosexuality from 1990 to 2011, I use data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The 
WVS conducts nationally representative surveys in almost 100 countries, using a common 
questionnaire. It is the largest cross-national time series investigation available that measures 
value change globally (WVS 2018). The questionnaire for each wave consists of over 200 
closed-ended questions that measure individuals’ attitudes toward social, political, economic, 
health, and environmental issues.  There are currently a total of six waves of WVS data collected 
in 1980, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2007, and 2011. These waves were collected cross-sectionally, 
meaning that a different group of respondents was interviewed in each wave. The seventh wave 
(collected in 2017) will be made available to the public in 2020 (WVS 2018).  
The Turkish Statistics Institute conducted the World Values Survey in Turkey under the 
supervision of Professor Yilmaz Esmer. Turkish respondents were interviewed face to face 
regardless of their language, citizenship, and immigration status, though the surveys were all 
conducted in Turkish. Although an English version of the questionnaire was available, as a 
native Turkish speaker I did use my own translations if I thought the conceptualization of a 
question needed improvement.  
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The sample was selected utilizing multi-stage full probability sampling by the Turkish 
Statistics Institute (TSI). The population was divided into twelve NUTS (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics) regions. These are Istanbul, West Marmara, Aegean, East 
Marmara, West Anatolia, Mediterranean, Central Anatolia, West Black Sea, East Black Sea, 
Northeast Anatolia, Centraleast Anatolia, and Southeast Anatolia respectively. The TSI 
determined the probability sampling units (PSU’s) by using their “blocking system,” which 
divides the whole population into blocks of specified numbers of household addresses.  
Accordingly, 300 household addresses from the each of the 134 blocks (PSUs) were randomly 
selected from the whole population.  For interviewing, a fixed number of twelve households are 
randomly selected from the list of 300 in each block. When it was not possible to conduct an 
interview, because of refusal, an invalid address, or a demolished building, a randomly selected 
replacement address in the same block was provided to the interviewer.  Individuals were 
selected using a Kish grid (a random choosing of household survey respondents), and no quota 
sampling was allowed. Response rate of the survey was 72 percent (WVS 2018a). 
According to Treiman (2009:207) “if the survey was based on multistage probability 
sampling, the default assumption that the data are from a simple random sample tends to 
understate the true extent of sampling error in the data.” This means that the computed standard 
errors can be too small if we use statistical procedures based on the assumption of simple random 
sampling, (when each person in the larger population has an equal chance or probability of being 
in the sample). In order to avoid such sampling error, I use sampling weights (pweights) within 
the context of Stata’s “svy” suite of commands.   
My analysis uses data only from the 1990 and 2011 waves. This was necessary because 
Turkey was not among the countries that was surveyed in the 1980 wave. In addition, some of 
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the questions related to the variables of demographic values and justification of homosexuality 
were not asked in the mid-waves (1996 and 2001). The total sample size is 1,030 respondents for 
the 1990 wave and 1,605 respondents for the 2011 wave (See Table 1).  
 
 
 
Table 1: Survey Sample Size, Turkey 
Wave Sample Size 
1990 1,030 
2011 1,605 
Total 2,635 
Source: WVS 1990-2011 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Operationalization of Variables 
 
In this section of the chapter, I introduce my dependent and independent variables and 
how they were operationalized.  
Dependent Variables 
 In order to measure attitudes toward homosexuality, I use two main dependent variables:  
justification of homosexuality and homosexual neighbors.  
Question 1 on Homosexuality: 
One set of questions in the dataset asks respondents to note, on a scale from 1 to 10, 
whether they find certain controversial behaviors always right/justified, wrong/never justified, or 
something in between. This question is part of a battery of twelve questions. 
The English translation of this question is the following: 
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Now I am going to list certain behaviors. To what extent do you find these actions 
right/justified or wrong/never justified. If you find a behavior wrong/never justified, 
pick the score of “1.” If you find it always right/justified, pick the score of “10.” You 
may also pick a score in between.  
 
Wrong/never justifiable         Right/ always justifiable 
 
1  2  3  4 5  6  7  8  9  10 
 
score 
1- claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to   .... 
2- avoiding a fare on public transport      .... 
3- cheating on tax if you have the chance      .... 
4- someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties    .... 
5- homosexuality          .... 
6- abortion          .... 
7- divorce          .... 
8- sex before marriage        .... 
9- suicide           .... 
10- for a man to beat his wife        .... 
11- parents beating children        .... 
12- violence against other people        .... 
 
From these behaviors, I use the justification of homosexuality variable, measuring Turkish 
respondents’ attitudes toward homosexuality. 
Question 2 on Homosexuality: 
 
In another set of questions respondents were asked to identify various groups of people 
they would not like to have as neighbors. The English translation of this question is the 
following: 
Say a new neighbor is moving next door. Could you please sort out any group of people 
that you would not like to have as neighbors? 
 
1- drug addicts, people of a different race 
2- people who have AIDS 
3- immigrants/foreign workers 
4- homosexuals 
5- people of a different religion 
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6- heavy drinkers 
7- unmarried couples living together 
8- people who speak a different language  
 
From these groups, I use the homosexual neighbor variable to measure attitudes toward 
homosexuality. The variable homosexual neighbors is measured as a binary variable, asking 
whether respondents would not want or can have homosexuals as neighbors.   
 These two dependent variables do have limitations with regard to their measurement of 
homosexuality. Specifically, the questions do not distinguish between female and male 
homosexuality. In the case of Turkey, homosexuality is predominantly associated with male 
behavior. Female homosexuality is often silenced and not considered legitimate since it does not 
involve penile penetration (Habib 2007). Thus, these two variables may be over-measuring 
attitudes toward male homosexuality. Another limitation is associated with the conceptualization 
of justification of homosexuality question. When we say an act is justifiable, it implies that the 
act could be excused or that it was done for a good reason. In other words, rather than measuring 
acceptance of homosexuality, the question may be measuring homosexual behavior that is 
conducted in extreme circumstances, such as in prison or rape. Nevertheless, these questions still 
provide significant insights on changes in the respondents’ values with regard to homosexuality.  
Independent Variables: 
 The main independent variables I am using focus on demographic attitudes and politico-
religious values. 
Predictors of Demographic Attitudes: 
For the demographic attitudes, I am using three variables that are consistent with features 
of the second demographic transition. These include justification of abortion, justification of 
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divorce, and importance of family.  Demographers argue that when countries are in their second 
demographic transition, the residents become more tolerant toward abortion and divorce. 
Alternatively, when countries undergo the demographic transition, family ties tend to weaken.  
Both the justification of abortion and the justification of divorce variables are measured 
on a 10-point scale, where “1” indicates never justifiable/wrong and “10” indicates always 
justifiable/right. The importance of family is measured as a Likert-Scale variable; the answer 
choices for the importance of family range from very important, rather important, not very 
important, to not at all important. It is not statistically appropriate to use the variable importance 
of family as an interval variable because the values are ranked but the real distances between the 
ranks are unknown. Thus, I recoded this variable into a single dummy variable measuring 
whether the respondent considers family important in life or not important in life. The categories 
of very important are recoded as “1” and the categories of rather important, not very important 
and not at all important are recoded as “0.”  Using factor analysis, I also created a demographic 
index, containing the variables justification of abortion and justification of divorce. I excluded 
the importance of family from this measure due its low factor loading score. Only the first factor 
was high enough for me to include in the analysis as the eigenvalue from one-factor solution to 
two-factor solution drops from 1.62 to .38.  Factor loading scores for both divorce and abortion 
were .90. 
Predictors of Politico-Religious Values: 
The second main category of independent variables is the individuals’ politico-religious 
values. I use individuals’ level of religiosity as well as their political values as predictor variables 
representing their politico-religious values.  Individuals’ political opinion is measured with the 
following question: In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right.” How would you 
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place your views on this scale, generally speaking? The answer is measured as a 10-point left-
right scale, ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right).  
In addition, there are three questions in the data set that measure the respondents’ 
religious attitudes. These questions ask the individuals about the frequency of their attending 
religious services, the importance of God in their life, and the importance of religion in their life. 
The variable frequency of attending religious services is recoded as a true interval ratio variable 
that measures respondents’ frequency of attending religious services per year (never = 0, less 
often= 0.5, once a year= 1, once a month= 12, only on special holidays = 16, once a week= 53, 
and more than once a week = 156).  
The importance of God in respondents’ lives is measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 
indicates not at all important and 10 indicates very important. Lastly, the answer choices for the 
variable importance of religion range from very important, rather important, not very important, 
to not at all important. I recoded importance of religion into a dummy variable, measuring 
whether the individuals consider religion to be important in their life or not important in their 
life. The categories of very important and rather important are recoded as “1” while the 
categories of not very important and not at all important are recoded as “0.”  Using factor 
analysis, I also created a politico-religiosity index, combining the four variables just discussed. 
Only the first factor was satisfactory to include in the analysis; I followed this strategy because 
the eigenvalue from a one-factor solution to a two-factor solution drops from 1.78 to .89. Factor 
loadings for the four politico-religiosity variables (left-right scale, attendance religious services, 
importance of God, and importance of religion) were .63, .54, .76, and .72 respectively. 
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Control Variables: 
 
In my dissertation analyses, I control for a number of socio-demographic variables. 
Previous literature confirms that disapproval of homosexuality is found among men, less 
educated, older respondents, married, rural residents, and of those lower income (Crowell 2007). 
Thus, I opted to control for respondents’ gender, age, years of education, marital status, and 
income. I was not able to control for the respondents’ rural status since this variable is not 
available in the dataset. Respondents’ gender is operationalized as a binary variable, measures 
whether the respondent is male or female and is coded as 0 if male or 1 if female. Respondents’ 
age is operationalized as a continuous variable, reflecting years of age. The educational 
attainment variable is operationalized as years of schooling. The variable income is measured on 
a subjective scale of 1 to 10, in which “1” indicates the lowest income group and “10” indicates 
the highest income group. Lastly, marital status is initially operationalized, as married, living 
together as married, divorced, separated, widowed, and single. I recoded marital status into a 
dummy variable of ever-married; if they were ever married or cohabiting=1, otherwise=0.  
 
3.3. Statistical Methods 
 
In order to ascertain the degree to which attitudes toward homosexuality are influenced 
by demographic attitudes and politico-religious attitudes, I will estimate a total of sixteen 
regression equations (eight testing tolerance toward homosexuality predicted by demography and 
politico-religiosity index, and the other eight testing each independent variable’s individual 
effect on values regarding homosexuality). I will use ordered logit regression equations to 
ascertain the degree of relationship between the demographic attitudes variables and the 
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dependent variable of justification of homosexuality. There are two reasons why using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) is inappropriate for this part of my analysis. One reason is that the variable 
justification of homosexuality has extreme scores among respondents who deemed 
homosexuality to be unjustifiable (score 1). Thus, the normality assumption of OLS regression is 
not met, which makes using OLS regression inappropriate. Another issue is that scores are 
ranked between 1 to 10, but the real distances between the ranks are unknown. Intervals between 
all the scores may not necessarily equal 1 for all respondents. Therefore, utilizing ordered logit 
regression is justified in order to avoid the assumption that the distances between the categories 
are equal. 
Each of my analyses includes 6 Models. Model 1 of Analysis 1 solely looks at the binary 
relation between demographic attitudes (justification of abortion, justification of divorce, dummy 
importance of family, dummy degree of nationalism) and justification of homosexuality. In Model 
2, I include the dummy variable female to control for the effect of being female. In Model 3, I 
add the control variable age. Model 4 includes years of education as an additional control 
variable. Model 5 includes income as a control variable. Lastly, I add the dummy variable of 
ever-married in Model 6 as a control along with the rest of the predictor variables.   
 The second analysis examines the effect of demographic attitudes on respondents’ desire 
to live next to homosexual individuals. I estimate binary logistic regression equations to examine 
the degree of relationship between the set of explanatory variables and the dichotomous 
dependent variable. In analysis 2, I also construct 6 models similar to my approach in analysis 1.  
Model 1 begins with the bivariate regression of the variables demographic attitudes and 
homosexual neighbors.  In Models 2 to 6, I include the variables dummy female, age, years of 
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education, income, and dummy ever-married respectively in order to control for the effects of all 
the predictor variables on wanting homosexuals as neighbors. 
The third analysis examines the effect of politico-religious values on the justification of 
homosexuality.  I estimate an ordered logit regression equation to examine the extent of the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable justification of 
homosexuality. Model 1 of Analysis 3 solely looks at the binary relation between the 
respondent’s politico-religious values (political opinion, religious services, importance of God, 
dummy importance of religion) and justification of homosexuality. In Models 2 to 6, I include the 
variables dummy female, age, years of education, income, and dummy ever-married respectively 
in order to control for the effects of all the predictor variables on the justification of 
homosexuality. 
In analysis 4, I examine the effect of politico-religious values on respondents’ desire to 
live next to homosexual individuals. For these analyses, I use binary logistic regression to 
examine the degree of the relationship between the set of explanatory variables and the binary 
dependent variable. The first model of Analysis 4 only examines the relationship between the 
variables politico-religious values (political opinion, religious services, importance of God, 
dummy importance of religion) and homosexual neighbors. I then add the control variables 
dummy female, age, years of education, income, and dummy ever-married respectively to the 
regression equation in order to control for the effects of all the predictor variables on not wanting 
homosexual neighbors.  
I estimate these regression analyses for both the 1990 and 2011 waves in order to 
ascertain how and whether the influence of demographic values and politico-religious values on 
attitudes toward homosexuality have changed over time. Lastly, I examine the combined 
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demographic and politico-religious attitudes hypothesis in order to determine how and whether 
the effect of politico-religious values is greater than the effect of demographic attitudes 
explaining tolerance toward homosexuality. I compare the R-Squared values of Analysis 1 and 
Analysis 3 to see whether demographic attitudes have a greater or lesser effect on justification of 
homosexuality. Similarly, I compare the Pseudo R-Squared values of Analysis 2 and Analysis 4 
to elucidate whether demographic theory or the politico-religiosity has a greater explanatory 
power elucidating tolerance toward homosexual neighbors in Turkey. 
In the next chapter, I demonstrate the findings of my dissertation research. More 
specifically, I show how attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkey has changed over time, and 
how they are influenced by demographic values and politico-religious values respectively.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter, I present the findings from my dissertation research about the effects of 
demographic attitudes and politico-religious attitudes on tolerance toward homosexuality in 
Turkish society. First, I begin the chapter with several descriptive analyses of my data, followed 
by a discussion of recent changes in demographic and politico-religious values in Turkey.  I will 
then present the results of my logistic and ordered logistic regression analyses.  
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 provide descriptive statistics of my dependent, independent, and 
control variables for the 1990 wave and the 2011 wave of data (see my discussion in the previous 
chapter about these datasets).  The total sample size is 1,030 respondents for the 1990 wave and 
1,605 respondents for the 2011 wave. However, owing to missing data, my samples were 
reduced to 787 for the 1990 wave and to 1,337 for the 2011 wave (See Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). 
A total 81 percent of the samples had values on all the variables. The variable measuring 
respondents’ political attitudes has the most missing values: 132 cases for the 1990 wave and 
152 cases for the 2011 wave. To deal with missing data, I computed my analyses using both the 
multiple imputation method and the list-wise deletion method.  For the multiple imputation 
method, missing data was imputed using Stata’s mi impute command with 20 imputations for all 
variables, with the exception of variables gender and homosexual neighbor (which have no 
missing data). After comparing the results from both list-wise deletion and multiple imputation 
method, I found that my results showed similar support (or no support) for my hypotheses. Thus, 
I report the results below using list-wise deletion.  
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Table 1.1: 1990 Wave: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
Would like as neighbors     
  Homosexuals .07  0 1 
Is … Justifiable?     
  Homosexuality 1.56 1.62 1 10 
 
Independent Variables 
    
     
Demographic Attitudes     
  Abortion 4.32 3.01 1 10 
  Divorce 5.16 2.91 1 10 
  Importance of Family .87  0 1 
Demography Index .48 1.01 -.97 2.53 
     
Politico-Religious Attitudes     
  Religious Services 40.02 53.55 0 156 
  Importance of God 8.86 2.33 1 10 
  Importance of religion .61  0 1 
  Left/right (1-10) Scale 5.46 2.12 1 10 
Politico-religiosity Index -.14 1.15 -3.86 1.70 
Control Variables     
Female .48  0 1 
Years of Education 8.01 3.74 0 14 
Age 36.65 13.55 18 84 
Income Scale 4.01 1.31 1 10 
Ever-married .77  0 1 
 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990.     Valid N= 787 
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Table 1.2: 2011 Wave: Descriptive Statistics  
  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
Would like as neighbors     
  Homosexuals .17  0 1 
Is … Justifiable?     
  Homosexuality 1.74 1.77 1 10 
 
Independent Variables 
    
     
Demographic Attitudes     
  Abortion 2.29 2.17 1 10 
  Divorce 3.39 2.91 1 10 
  Importance of Family .96  0 1 
Demography Index -.26 .88 -.97 2.53 
     
Politico-Religious Attitudes     
  Religious Services 34.57 49.16 0 156 
  Importance of God 9.18 1.53 1 10 
  Importance of religion .66  0 1 
  Left/Right (1-10) Scale 6.21 2.50 1 10 
Politico-religiosity Index .12 .84 -3.86 1.70 
Control Variables     
Female .51  0 1 
Years of Education 10.49 3.72 0 16 
Age 38.41 14.18 18 86 
Income Scale 5.73 1.87 1 10 
Ever-married .73  0 1 
 
Source: World Values Survey, 2011     Valid N= 1,337 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
I used two dependent variables (homosexual neighbors and justification of 
homosexuality) to measure attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkey. When the World Values 
Survey interviewers asked the respondents in 1990 whether they would like to have homosexuals 
as neighbors, around 93 percent stated they would not like to have homosexuals as neighbors. In 
the 2011 wave, the percentage not wishing to have homosexuals as neighbors decreased to 83 
percent. (See Table 2). A chi-square test showed that this was a significant reduction (chi (2) = 
38.2, p=.000) (See Table 12).   
 
 
Table 2. Percent Reported Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors, Turkey 
Would … as neighbors:  
homosexuals 
1990 2011 
   not like 92.50 83.02 
   Have 7.59 16.98 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011 
 
 
 
On a scale of 1 to 10, mean justification of homosexuality has also increased from 1.56 in 
1990 to 1.74 in 2011 (See Tables 1.1 and 1.2).  T-test results showed that this was a significant 
increase (t=-2.38, p=.02) (See Table 11). Around 85 percent of respondents said homosexuality 
was never justifiable in 1990 compared to 77 percent in 2011 (See Table 3). Descriptive data 
show that although there is an increased tolerance toward homosexuality in Turkey, attitudes 
toward homosexuality are still very intolerant.  
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Table 3. Percent Reported Tolerance toward Homosexuality, Turkey 
Justification of 
homosexuality 
1990 2011 
1–never justifiable 84.50 77.11 
2 4.70 8.23 
3 2.00 2.17 
4 1.91 4.71 
5 .64 1.20 
6 3.56 .97 
7 .38 1.35 
8 .89 1.26 
9 .76 .45 
10–always justifiable .76 1.20 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
I used three independent variables to measure Turkish individuals’ demographic 
attitudes: justification of abortion, justification of divorce, and importance of family. I find that 
tolerance toward abortion has been significantly reduced in Turkey since 1990. The mean 
justification for abortion decreased from 4.32 (on a scale from 1 to 10) in 1990 to 2.29 in 2011 
(See Tables 1.1. and 1.2). I find that this was a very significant reduction (t=17.96, p=.000) (See 
Table 11). Moreover, around 35 percent of the respondents in 1990 said that abortion was never 
justifiable compared to 63 percent in 2011. The percentage of individuals who said abortion is 
always justifiable dropped from around 8 percent in 1990 to 2 percent in 2011 (See Table 4).  
Similar to attitudes toward abortion, the tolerance toward divorce was also significantly 
decreased in Turkey during the study period (t= 13.56, p=.000) (See Table 11). The mean 
justification divorce was 5.16 (on a scale from 1 to 10) in 1990 compared to 3.39 in 2011 (see 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2). The percentage believing divorce is never justifiable increased from 22 
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percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 2011. In contrast, the percentage believing divorce is always 
justifiable decreased from 12 percent in 1990 to 5 percent in 2011 (See Table 5).  Importance of 
family also remains very high in Turkey. Respondents who think that the family is really 
important in life significantly increased from 87 percent of the respondents in 1990 to 96 percent 
in 2011 (chi square= 56.13, p=.000) (See Table 12). 
 
 
Table 4. Percent Reported Tolerance toward Abortion, Turkey 
Justification of abortion 1990 2011 
1–never justifiable 35.20 63.43 
2 3.18 9.50 
3 5.97 4.71 
4 5.08 3.96 
5 5.59 9.27 
6 25.79 2.47 
7 3.18 2.69 
8 4.83 1.57 
9 3.43 .22 
10–always justifiable 7.75 2.17 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2011 
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Table 5. Percent Reported Tolerance toward Divorce, Turkey  
Justification of divorce 1990 2011 
1–never justifiable 22.24 49.39 
2 2.41 6.66 
3 6.48 5.68 
4 4.57 4.56 
5 4.57 10.55 
6 35.96 5.68 
7 3.30 5.91 
8 6.10 4.56 
9 2.54 2.77 
10–always justifiable 11.82 5.24 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2011 
 
 
 
Table 6. Percent Reported Importance of Family, Turkey 
Importance of family 1990 2011 
1-not at all important .13 .15 
2 .89 .07 
3 12.07 4.11 
4-very important 86.91 95.66 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011 
 
 
 
 
The minimum and maximum values for the demography index ranged from −.97 to 2.53 
with a mean of .48 and a standard deviation of 1.01 for 1990 (See Table 1.1). The mean for the 
demography index is -.26 with a standard deviation of .88 for 2011 (see Table 1.2). A further 
analysis of means shows that the level of demographic attitudes experienced a significant 
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decrease between 1990 and 2011 (t=17.66, p=.000) (See Table 11). Overall, my descriptive 
results demonstrate that trends regarding demographic attitudes in Turkey are working in an 
opposite way than that predicted by second demographic transition theory.  
I used four independent variables to measure respondents’ politico-religious attitudes: 
attendance at religious services, importance of God, importance of religion, and political (left-
right) scale. On average, Turkish individuals attended religious services on average 40 times per 
year in 1990 compared to 35 times in 2011 (See Table 1.1 and 1.2). The analysis of means 
confirms that this was a significant reduction (t= 2.39, p=.02) (See Table 11). Descriptive data 
also show that individuals who attended religious services 156 times decreased from around 16 
percent in 1990 to 12 percent in 2011 (See Table 7).  
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Percent Reported Attendance to Religious Services, Turkey 
Attendance to religious 
services 
1990 2011 
.5 32.27 26.93 
0 1.14 5.16 
1 2.29 2.92 
12 3.43 4.11 
16 23.13 29.09 
52 22.11 19.45 
156 15.63 12.34 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2011 
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Table 8. Percent Reported Importance of God, Turkey  
Importance of God 1990 2011 
1–not at all important 3.81 .83 
2 .76 .07 
3 1.91 .60 
4 1.14 .75 
5 3.68 1.27 
6 1.65 2.32 
7 4.19 5.53 
8 4.70 11.29 
9 5.97 10.17 
10–very important 72.17 67.17 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990-2011 
 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10, the mean importance of God increased significantly from 8.86 in 
1990 to 9.18 in 2011 (t=-3.80, p=.000) (See Table 11). Moreover, the percentage of individuals 
who considered God not at all important in their lives (score of 1) dropped from 4 percent in 
1990 to under 1 percent in 2011. Alternatively, 72 percent of the respondents considered God 
very important in life (score of 10) in 1990 compared to 67 percent in 2011 (See Table 8). The 
importance of religion among Turkish individuals has only increased marginally since 1990 (chi 
square= 3.39, p=.06). Just over 60 percent of individuals said religion is very important in life in 
1990, compared to 66 percent in 2011 (See Table 9). On a scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right), 
Turkish individuals positioned themselves on average at the scale of 5 in 1990, regarding their 
political beliefs, compared to an average of 6 in 2011. This was a significant increase during the 
study period (t= -7.10, p=.000) (See Table 11). The data on the distributions of respondents on 
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the left-right scale show that only 35 percent of individuals scored a 6 or more, expressing right-
wing attitudes in 1990, compared to 64 percent in 2011 (See Table 10). 
 
 
Table 9. Percent Reported Importance of Religion, Turkey 
Importance of religion 1990 2011 
1-not at all important 4.83 2.77 
2 10.80 4.41 
3 22.74 27.23 
4-very important 61.63 65.59 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Percent Reported Political Scale (Left-Right), Turkey  
Importance of God 1990 2011 
1–left 4.32 5.53 
2 2.67 3.66 
3 8.51 7.03 
4 7.88 5.83 
5 41.42 14.88 
6 9.40 17.13 
7 8.89 12.79 
8 6.73 12.79 
9 2.41 8.53 
10–right 7.75 11.82 
N 787 1,337 
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011 
 
 
The minimum and maximum values for the politico-religiosity index range from −3.86 to 
1.70 with a mean of -.14 and a standard deviation of 1.15 for 1990. The mean level of politico-
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religiosity index is .12 with a standard deviation of .84 for 2011 (see Table 1.2). A further 
analysis shows that the level of politico-religiosity in Turkey has significantly increased from 
1990 to 2011 (t=-5.94, p=.000) (See Table 11). Overall, the descriptive results demonstrate that 
trends regarding politico-religious attitudes in Turkey are in line with the literature pertaining to 
the contemporary rise in political Islam.  
Lastly, I control in my analyses for individuals’ gender, years of education, age, income 
scale, and marital status (See Table 1.1 and 1.2). Individuals’ level of education ranged from 0 to 
14 years in 1990 and from 0 to 16 years in 2011. In 1990, respondents on average had 8 years of 
education compared to 10 years in 2011. On a scale from 1 to 10, mean income level was 4.01 
with a standard deviation of 1.31 in 1990. Alternatively, mean income level was 5.73 with a 
standard deviation of 1.87 in 2011. Respondents’ age ranged from 18 to 84 in 1990 and 18 to 86 
in 2011, with a mean age of 37 and 39, respectively. About 48 percent of the respondents were 
female in 1990 compared to 51 percent in 2011. About 33 percent of the sample in 1990, and 27 
percent in 2011 were single, or never married, while the rest of the respondents were either 
married, previously married, or cohabiting.  
In the next section of this chapter, I report my findings from the estimated regression 
analyses. First, I present the results derived from the factor analyses that use the combined 
demography index and the politico-religiosity index to predict tolerance toward homosexuality. I 
next examine each independent variable and its respective impact on attitudes toward 
homosexuality individually. 
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Table 11. Value Change Over Time: Analysis of Means by Year 
Year Homosexuality Divorce Abortion Religious 
services 
Importance 
of God 
Political 
Scale  
Demography 
Index 
Politico-
religiosity Index 
1990 1.56 5.16 4.32 40.02 8.86 5.46 .48 -.14 
2011 1.74 3.39 2.29 34.57 9.18 6.21 -.26 .12 
         
t-score -2.38 13.56 17.96 2.39 -3.80 -7.10 17.66 -5.94 
p-value .02 .000 .000 .02 .000 .000 .000 .000 
         
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011          Valid N= 787-1,337 
 
 
 
Table 12. Percent Reported Value change by Year 
Year Homosexual 
neighbors 
Importance of 
family 
Importance of 
religion 
1990 7.40 86.92 61.60 
2011 17.00 95.66 65.60 
    
Chi (2) 38.20 56.13 3.39 
p-value .000 .000 .06 
    
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011  Valid N= 787-1,337 
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4.2. The Effects of Demography and Politico-religiosity Index 
 
Tables 13 to 20 present the odds ratios from logistic regressions of tolerance toward 
homosexuality, predicted by the demography index and by the politico-religiosity index. To 
discuss the effects of independent variables, I chose to present the odds ratio coefficients instead 
of the log odds, since odds ratios are more intuitive to interpret (Treiman 2009). In Table 13 and 
Table 14, I present the odds ratios derived from binary logistic regression, since the dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable.  For both 1990 and 2011, we can see a positive correlation 
between the demography index and attitudes toward homosexual neighbors (See Table 13 and 
Table 14).  The odds ratio coefficient for the demography index is 1.45 in 1990. This means that 
demographic attitudes significantly increase the odds of tolerance toward having homosexual 
neighbors by 1.45 times or by 45 percent, controlling for years of education, being female, age, 
ever-married, and income (See Table 13 Model 6). Similarly, the odds ratios coefficient for the 
demography index is 1.21 in 2011. This means that the odds of having tolerant attitudes toward 
homosexual neighbors significantly increase by 21 percent with every unit increase in the 
demography index, controlling for the other variables (See Table 14 Model 6).  Table 14 also 
shows that odds of having tolerant attitudes toward homosexual neighbors increase with years of 
education and income scale by 8 and 15 percent respectively, and decreases with being ever-
married by 44 percent.  
Table 15 and table 16 present the odds ratio coefficients derived from binary logistic 
regression, showing the relationship between the politico-religiosity index and attitudes toward 
homosexual neighbors in 1990 and 2011 respectively. The results show that there is a negative 
correlation between individuals’ level of politico-religiosity and tolerance toward homosexual 
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neighbors. The odds ratio coefficient for the politico-religiosity index in 1990 is 0.76 (See Table 
15 Model 6).  This means that for every additional increase in respondents’ politico-religiosity 
reduces the odds of wanting to live next to homosexual individuals by 24 percent, controlling for 
the other variables (Table 15 Model 6). In 2011, the odds ratio coefficient for politico religiosity 
index is 0.54 (See Table 16). This means that politico-religiosity decreases the odds of wanting 
to live next to homosexual individuals by 46 percent, controlling for the other variables (See 
Table 16 Model 6).  Higher education and income scale also increase the odds of wanting to live 
next to homosexuals by 6 and 16 percent, respectively (Table 16 Model 6).  
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Table 13: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Demography Index, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variable:       
  Homosexual Neighbor: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent Variable       
  Demography Index 1.53** 1.51** 1.47* 1.46* 1.46* 1.45* 
Control Variables       
  Education  1.01 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.00 
  Female   1.44 1.46 1.52 1.50 
  Age    1.00 1.02+ 1.02+ 
  Ever-married     .34*** .34*** 
  Income      1.07 
Constant .06*** .06*** .04*** .04*** .05*** .04*** 
Pseudo R2 .02 .02 .03 .03 .05 .05 
Degrees of freedom 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 1990     Binary Logistic Regression   Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 14: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Demography Index, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable:       
  Homosexual Neighbors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variable       
  Demography Index 1.34*** 1.19* 1.19+ 1.21* 1.21* 1.21* 
Control Variables       
  Education  1.14*** 1.14*** 1.10*** 1.09*** 1.08** 
  Female   1.07 1.03 1.07 1.05 
  Age      .98**  .99  .99 
  Ever-married      .66*  .66* 
  Income      1.15** 
Constant  .19***  .05***  .05***   .14***   .15***   .08*** 
Pseudo R2  .01  .04  .04   .05   .05   .06 
Degrees of freedom 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 2011       Binary Logistic Regression Valid N=1,337 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 15: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Politico-religiosity Index, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variable:       
  Homosexual Neighbors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variable       
  Politico-Religiosity Index   .73**   .74**   .75**   .74**   .75** .76** 
Control Variables       
  Years of Education  1.01 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.00 
  Female   1.47 1.51 1.58+ 1.55 
  Age    1.01 1.02* 1.02* 
  Ever-married       .35**   .35** 
  Income      1.10 
Constant   .07***   .07***   .05***   .03***   .05***   .04*** 
Pseudo R2   .02   .02   .03   .03   .05   .05 
Degrees of freedom 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 1990       Binary Logistic Regression   Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 16: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Politico-religiosity Index, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable:       
  Homosexual Neighbors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variable       
  Politico-Religiosity Index .48*** .53*** .53*** .54*** .55*** .54*** 
Control Variables       
  Years of Education  1.10*** 1.10*** 1.08** 1.07** 1.06* 
  Female   .97 .95 .97 .95 
  Age    .99* .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .74 .75 
  Income      1.16*** 
Constant .18*** .07*** .07*** .15*** .16*** .08*** 
Pseudo R2 .06 .08 .08 .08 .08 .9 
df_m 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 2011       Binary Logistic Regression   Valid N=1,337 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Next, I move on to examining how and whether attitudes toward justification of 
homosexuality are influenced by demography and politico-religiosity. Tables 17 and 18 show the 
odds ratio coefficients, illustrating the effect of level of demographic attitudes on justification of 
homosexuality in 1990 and 2011 respectively. There is a significant and positive relationship 
between demographic values and tolerance toward homosexuality for both 1990 and 2011 (See 
Table 17 and Table 18). The odds ratio coefficient for demography index is 1.84 in 1990. This 
means that odds of justification of homosexuality increase by 84 percent with each unit increase 
in demography index, controlling for the other variables (Table 17 Model 6). The odds ratio 
coefficient of demography index is 3.62 in 2011. This may be interpreted as meaning that as 
Turkish individuals’ levels of demographic attitudes increase, their odds of holding tolerant 
attitudes toward homosexuality significantly increase by 3.62 times (262 percent), controlling for 
the other variables (Table 18 Model 6). 
The odds ratio coefficients of justification of homosexuality predicted by politico-
religiosity are presented in tables 19 and 20. The results show that there is a significant negative 
association between politico-religious values and the justification of homosexuality in both 1990 
and 2011 (See Table 19 and Table 20). The odds ratio coefficient for politico-religiosity is 0.67 
in 1990. This means that for every one unit increase in politico-religiosity, the odds of 
justification of homosexuality are reduced by 33 percent, ceteris paribus (Table 19 Model 6). 
Similarly, the odds ratio coefficient of the politico-religiosity index, derived via the ordered 
logistic regression, is .65 in 2011 (See Table 20).  This indicates that as one’s level of politico-
religiosity increases, the odds justifying homosexuality are reduced by 45 percent, ceteris paribus 
(Table 20 Model 6). Lastly, higher education and being female also increase the odds of 
justification of homosexuality by 6 and 41 percent respectively (Table 20 Model 6).  
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Table 17: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Demography Index, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variable:       
  Justification of homosexuality: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variable       
  Demography Index 1.87*** 1.81*** 1.78*** 1.85*** 1.86*** 1.84*** 
Control Variables       
  Education  1.03 1.04 1.01 .99 .98 
  Female   1.28 1.16 1.22 1.21 
  Age    .97** .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .43** .43** 
  Income      1.07 
Pseudo R2 .03 .04 .04 .05 .06 .06 
Degrees of freedom 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 1990      Ordered Logistic Regression   Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 18: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Demography Index, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable       
  Justification of homosexuality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variable       
  Demography Index 3.63*** 3.52*** 3.50*** 3.61*** 3.62*** 3.62*** 
Control Variables       
  Years of Education  1.03 1.04+ 1.00 .99 .99 
  Female   1.45* 1.37+ 1.42* 1.42* 
  Age    .98*** .98* .98* 
  Ever-married     .64* .64* 
  Income      1.00 
Pseudo R2 .11 .11 .11 .12 .12 .12 
Degrees of freedom 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 2011      Ordered Logistic Regression  Valid N=1,337 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 19: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Politico-religiosity Index, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variable       
  Justification of Homosexuality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variable       
  Politico-religiosity index .63*** .66*** .66*** .67*** .67*** .67*** 
Control Variables       
  Years of education  1.04 1.05 1.02 1.01 .99 
  Female   1.32 1.24 1.30 1.27 
  Age    .98* .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .46** .46** 
  Income      1.12 
Pseudo R2 .03 .03 .03 .04 .04 .05 
Degrees of freedom 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 1990      Ordered Logistic Regression   Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 20: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Politico-religiosity Index, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable       
  Justification of homosexuality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variable       
 Politico-religiosity index .57*** .62*** .63*** .65*** .65*** .65*** 
Control Variables       
  Years of Education  1.07** 1.08*** 1.06* 1.05* 1.06* 
  Female   1.39* 1.37* 1.41* 1.41* 
  Age    .99* .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .73+ .73+ 
  Income      .98 
Pseudo R2 .02 .02 .03 .03 .03 .03 
Degrees of freedom 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Source: WVS 2011      Ordered Logistic Regression   Valid N=1,337 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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4.3. The Effects of Demographic Attitudes and Politico-religious Attitudes: Testing Independent 
Factors Separately 
In Section 4.2., I examined the overall effect of demographic attitudes and politico-
religious attitudes on tolerance toward homosexuality in Turkey. In this section, I will analyze 
each independent variable’s individual effect on values regarding homosexuality. Tables 21 to 24 
portray the odds ratios of tolerance toward homosexuality predicted by demographic attitudes 
(justification of abortion, justification of divorce, and importance of family) in 1990 and 2011. 
Among the demography variables, I find that justification of abortion is a significant predictor of 
tolerance toward homosexuality. For every additional increase in one’s justification of abortion, 
the odds of having tolerant attitudes toward homosexual neighbors increase by 11 percent in 
1990 and by 10 percent in 2011, ceteris paribus (See Table 21 and Table 22). Similarly, the odds 
of justification of homosexuality increase by 24 percent in 1990 and by 53 percent in 2011 with 
every additional increase in justification of abortion, controlling for other variables (See Table 23 
Model 6 and Table 24 Model 6).  Justification of divorce significantly predicts only the 
justification of homosexuality in 2011. That is, for every additional increase in justification of 
divorce, the odds of justification of homosexuality increase by 13 percent, controlling for the 
other variables (Table 24 Model 6). The importance of family is also negatively associated with 
the justification of homosexuality in 2011. As the importance of family increases, the odds of 
justification of homosexuality decrease by half. In 1990, among the control variables, only being 
ever-married were significantly and inversely related to justification of homosexuality. In 
contrast to 1990, in 2011 being female significantly increased the odds of justification of 
homosexuality by 48 percent while an increase in age, and being ever-married reduced the odds 
by 2 and 36 percent respectively (Table 24 Model 6).  
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Table 21: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Demographic Attitudes, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variable       
  Homosexual Neighbors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Justification of abortion 1.12* 1.12* 1.11* 1.11* 1.12* 1.11* 
  Justification of divorce 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 
  Importance of family .65 .65 .64 .64 .79 .79 
Control Variables       
  Years of Education  1.01 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.00 
  Female   1.43 1.45 1.49 1.48 
  Age    1.00 1.02+ 1.02+ 
  Ever-married     .35** .35** 
  Income      1.06 
Constant .05*** .05*** .04*** .03*** .04*** .03*** 
Pseudo R2 .03 .03 .03 .03 .05 .06 
Degrees of freedom 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 
Source: WVS 2011       Binary Logistic Regression  Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 22: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Demographic Attitudes, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable       
  Homosexual neighbors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Justification of abortion 1.14** 1.11* 1.11* 1.11* 1.11* 1.10* 
  Justification of divorce 1.00 .98 .98 .98 .98 .99 
  Importance of family .59+ .57+ .56+ .58+ .60 .60 
Control Variables       
  Years of education  1.14*** 1.14*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.08** 
  Female   1.10 1.06 1.09 1.07 
  Age    .98** .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .66* .67* 
  Income      1.15** 
Constant .22*** .07*** .06*** .18** .19** .10*** 
Pseudo R2 .02 .04 .04 .05 .06 .06 
Degrees of freedom 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 
Source: WVS 2011      Binary Logistic Regression   Valid N=1,337   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 23: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Demographic Attitudes, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variables       
  Justification of homosexuality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Justification of abortion 1.25*** 1.24*** 1.23*** 1.24*** 1.24*** 1.24*** 
  Justification of divorce 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.01 
  Importance of family .59+ .59+ .58+ .58+ .68 .67 
Control Variables       
  Years of Education  1.04 1.04 1.01 1.00 .99 
  Female   1.24 1.13 1.17 1.16 
  Age    .97** .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .44** .44** 
  Income      1.06 
Pseudo R2 .04 .04 .05 .05 .06 .06 
Degrees of freedom 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 
Source: WVS 2011      Ordered Logistic Regression   Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 24: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Demographic Attitudes, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable       
  Justification of homosexuality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Justification of abortion 1.53*** 1.52*** 1.52*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 
  Justification of divorce 1.13*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 1.13*** 1.13*** 1.13*** 
  Importance of family .51* .51* .46* .48* .50* .50* 
Control Variables       
  Years of education  1.03 1.04+ 1.00 .99 1.00 
  Female   1.51* 1.44* 1.48* 1.48* 
  Age    .98*** .98* .98* 
  Ever-married      .64* .64* 
  Income       .98 
Pseudo R2 .12 .12 .12 .13 .13 .13 
Degrees of Freedom 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 
Source: WVS 2011       Ordered Logistic Regression  Valid N=1,337 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Among the effects of politico-religious attitudes (left/right scale, attendance to religious 
services, importance of God, and importance of religion), I find that importance of God is a 
significant predictor determining attitudes toward homosexuality, with the exception of 
predicting tolerance toward homosexual neighbors in 2011. In the 1990 wave, for every unit 
increase in importance of God, the odds of having tolerant attitudes toward homosexual 
neighbors decrease by 16 percent, ceteris paribus (See Table 25 Model 6). An increase in 
importance of God also reduces the odds of justification of homosexuality by 11 percent in 1990 
and 14 percent in 2011, ceteris paribus (Table 27 Model 6 and Table 28 Model 6). The left/right 
scale also becomes a significant predictor determining justification of homosexuality in 2011. 
Having more politically right values tend to reduce the odds of justification of homosexuality by 
13 percent, other things being equal (See Table 28 Model 6). While attendance at religious 
services significantly reduces the odds of justification of homosexuality in 1990, this variable 
loses its statistical significance as a predictor in 2011 (See table 27 Model 6 and Table 28 Model 
6). 
With regard to attitudes toward homosexual neighbors, both the left right scale and 
importance of religion becomes significant predictors in 2011. For every one unit increase in the 
left/right scale, the odds of holding tolerant attitudes toward homosexual neighbors decrease by 
15 percent, ceteris paribus (See Table 26 Model 6).  Similarly, as the importance of religion 
increases, the odds of holding tolerant attitudes toward homosexual neighbors decrease by 52 
percent, other things equal (See Table 26 Model 6).
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Table 25: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Politico-religious Attitudes, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variable       
  Homosexual Neighbor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Left/right scale .96 .96 .95 .95 .94 .94 
  Attendance to religious services 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00+ 1.01+ 
  Importance of God .86** .86** .85*** .85*** .85*** .84*** 
  Importance of religion  .91 .95 .90 .91 .98 1.01 
Control Variables       
  Years of Education  1.02 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.01 
  Female   2.00* 2.05* 2.20** 2.16** 
  Age    1.01 1.02* 1.02+ 
  Ever-married     .33*** .33*** 
  Income      1.12 
Constant .37* .31* .20** .14* .21* .16* 
Pseudo R2 .03 .03 .04 .04 .07 .07 
Degrees of Freedom 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
Source: WVS 1990       Binary Logistic Regression  Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 26: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexual Neighbors Predicted by Politico-religious Attitudes, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable       
  Homosexual neighbors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Left/ right scale .82*** .84*** .84*** .84*** .85*** .85*** 
  Attendance to religious services 1.00+ 1.00+ 1.00+ 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Importance of God .91* .94 .94 .94 .94 .93 
  Importance of religion .47** .50* .50* .51* .50* .48** 
Control Variables       
  Years of education  1.10*** 1.10*** 1.07** 1.07* 1.05+ 
  Female   .98 .97 1.00 .99 
  Age    .99* .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .77 .77 
  Income      1.16** 
Constant 3.15** 0.73 .74 1.53 1.54 .81 
Pseudo R2 .07 .08 .08 .09 .09 .10 
Degrees of freedom 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
Source: WVS 2011      Binary Logistic Regression  Valid N= 1,337 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 27: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Politico-religious Attitudes, Turkey 1990 
Dependent Variable       
  Justification of homosexuality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Left/ right scale 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 
  Attendance to religious services .99** .99** .99* .99* .99* .99* 
  Importance of God .88** .89** .89** .89* .89** .89** 
  Importance of religion .71 .79 .79 .76 .79 .81 
Control Variables       
  Years of education  1.05 1.05 1.03 1.01 1.00 
  Female   1.07 1.02 1.08 1.07 
  Age    .98* .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .47** .47** 
  Income      1.11 
Pseudo R2 .03 .04 .04 .04 .05 .05 
Degrees of freedom 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
Source: WVS 2011      Ordered Logistic Regression   Valid N=787 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 28: Odds Ratios of Tolerance toward Homosexuality Predicted by Politico-religious Attitudes, Turkey 2011 
Dependent Variable       
  Justification of homosexuality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Independent Variables       
  Left/ right scale .85*** .87*** .86*** .87*** .87*** .87*** 
  Attendance to religious services 1.00* 1.00* 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Importance of God .86** .87** .87** .86** .86** .86** 
  Importance of religion 1.27 1.35 1.36 1.38 1.37 1.37 
Control Variables       
  Years of education  1.05* 1.06** 1.04+ 1.04 1.05* 
  Female   1.41* 1.41* 1.44* 1.50* 
  Age    .99* .99 .99 
  Ever-married     .77 .77 
  Income      .99 
Pseudo R2 .03 .03 .03 .04 .04 .04 
Degrees of freedom 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 
Source: WVS 2011     Ordered Logistic Regression   Valid N=1,337 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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4.4. Do Politico-Religious Values Override Demography? 
 
In this section, I compare the Pseudo R-squared values (See Table 29) from my models in 
order to demonstrate which hypothesis, politico-religious or demographic attitudes, has the 
greater explanatory power, regarding tolerance toward homosexuality. In other words, which of 
my models best fit the data? Predicting attitudes toward homosexual neighbors, the Pseudo R-
squared values for demographic attitudes in 1990 and 2011 are .0289 and .0152 respectively 
(Also see Table 21 Model 1 and Table 22 Model 1). In contrast, the Pseudo R-squared values for 
politico-religiosity in 1990 and 2011 are .0292 and .0706 respectively (Also see Table 25 Model 
1 and Table 26 Model 1).  This illustrates that although the two models have rather similar 
explanatory power in 1990, the politico-religiosity model has greater explanatory power in 2011, 
explaining tolerance toward homosexual neighbors.  
Predicting attitudes toward the justification of homosexuality, the Pseudo R-squared 
values for demographic attitudes in 1990 and 2011 are .0433 and .1194 respectively (Also see 
Table 23 Model 1 and Table 24 Model 1). In contrast, the Pseudo R-squared values for politico-
religious attitudes in 1990 and 2011 are .0343 and .0276 respectively (See Table 27 Model 1 and 
Table 28 Model 1). This shows that the demographic model has greater explanatory power 
elucidating justification of homosexuality in Turkey. 
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Table 29: Pseudo R2 Values: From Tables 21 to 28 Model 1 
 
 
Homosexual 
neighbors 
Justification of 
Homosexuality 
1990   
   Demography .0289 .0433 
   Politico-Religion .0292 .0343 
2011   
   Demography .0152 .1194 
   Politico-Religion .0706 .0276 
   
Source: World Values Survey, 1990- 2011       Valid N=787-1,337 
 
 
 
4.5 Summary of Findings 
 
Drawing from both demographic transition theory and the literature on mobilization of 
political Islam, I hypothesized that demographic values consistent with the second demographic 
transition theory would be positively related to tolerance toward homosexuality while politico-
religious values would be inversely associated with tolerance toward homosexuality (Hypothesis 
1 and Hypothesis 2). The results from regressions using the combined scale indeed support these 
two overall hypotheses. As Turkish individuals’ demographic attitudes increase, their tolerance 
toward homosexual neighbors and justification of homosexuality also increase, and these results 
were found in both waves. In contrast, as Turkish individuals’ politico-religious values increase, 
they tend to become less tolerant of homosexual neighbors, and they are less likely to think that 
homosexuality is justifiable; this conclusion emerged in both waves of data (See Table 30).  
When I examined each demographic attitude variable individually, I found that the 
justification of abortion variable is a significant predictor of the two variables homosexual 
neighbors and justification of homosexuality in both the 1990 and 2011 waves. As individuals’ 
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level of justification of abortion increases, their tolerance toward homosexuality also increases. 
Therefore, my hypothesis 1A is supported. I find only partial support for Hypotheses 1B and 1C. 
That is, both justification of divorce and importance of family are significant predictors for 
justification of homosexuality only in 2011.  While the justification of divorce variable is 
positively associated with justification of homosexuality, the importance of the family variable is 
negatively associated with justification of homosexuality (See Table 30). 
When I examined each politico-religiosity variable’s impact on attitudes toward 
homosexuality, the variable importance of God was shown to significantly reduce justification of 
homosexuality in both 1990 and 2011 and tolerance toward homosexual neighbors in 1990. 
Thus, my hypothesis 2C is mostly supported. I also find partial support for Hypotheses 2A, 2B, 
and 2D. While not significant in 1990, the variable left/ right scale becomes a significant 
determinant of attitudes toward homosexuality in 2011. That is, as individuals’ identification 
with right values increase, they become less tolerant toward homosexuality (Hypothesis 2A). The 
importance of religion variable was also shown to be a significant predictor of justification of 
homosexuality in 2011 (Hypothesis 2D). In addition, attendance at religious services was shown 
to significantly decrease the justification of homosexuality in 1990, but not in 2011 (Hypothesis 
2B).  
Lastly, I found partial support for the combined demography and politico-religiosity 
hypothesis. The politico-religious model has greater power than demographic attitudes, 
explaining attitudes toward homosexual neighbors in 2011. On the other hand, the demography 
model has greater power than the politico-religious model, explaining justification of 
homosexuality both in 1990 and 2011. 
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Table 30: Summary of Findings 
 
Neighbors Justifiable 
 
 
1990 2011 1990 2011 H 
Demography Index ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 
  Abortion ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1a 
  Divorce 
   
✓ 1b 
  Family 
   
✓ 1c 
Politico-Religiosity Index ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 2 
  Left/right Scale  
 
✓ 
 
✓ 2a 
  Importance of religion 
 
✓ 
  
2b 
  Importance of God ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 2c 
  Religious Services 
  
✓ 
 
2c 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next, and the final, chapter of my dissertation, I will discuss the implications of my 
findings. Moreover, I will set forth some of the limitations of my research. I will also address the 
research in this general area that I plan to undertake in the next few years.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
This is the final chapter of my dissertation. It is comprised of a summary of my findings 
supported by the second demographic transition theory and the mobilization of political-Islam. In 
this chapter, I also discuss the implications of my results, and I address the limitations of my 
research. I then conclude my dissertation by setting out my future research agenda.  
  
5.1. Summary and Implications 
 
My dissertation investigates attitudes toward homosexuality in Turkey, and how and to 
what degree these attitudes have been influenced by demographic and politico-religious values. I 
evaluate empirically these issues with data from the 1990 and 2011 waves of the World Values 
Survey. In my literature review on same-sex sexuality, I find that same-sex affairs were common 
practices and tolerated during the Ottoman Empire. This acceptance, however, has decreased in 
the early 19th century in order to ameliorate relations with Western nations (Murray 2007; 
Ze’evi 2006). While there has been a reversal in trends regarding homosexuality in most Western 
societies, the tolerance of homosexuality has not progressed at the same speed in contemporary 
Turkey. My descriptive findings show that tolerance toward homosexuality increased only 
slightly between 1990 and 2011. I find that only 17 percent of Turkish individuals considered 
homosexuals as acceptable neighbors, and that 77 percent of respondents still consider 
homosexuality as wrong or never justifiable. The acceptance rates of homosexuality in Turkey 
lag behind those of all other European countries (Pew Research Center 2013). 
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Regarding Turkey’s demographic transition, the country is entering the final stage of the 
demographic transition in which birth and death rates will be low, and the population will only 
be increasing slightly, if at all. While Turkey is undergoing fertility and mortality changes that 
have characterized much of Europe since the 1980s and 1990s, my descriptive findings show that 
trends regarding demographic attitudes in Turkey are contrary to the predictions of the second 
demographic transition theory. More specifically, Turkish individuals’ tolerance of abortion and 
divorce has significantly decreased during the study period, while their values on the importance 
of family have increased. On the other hand, the literature and my descriptive findings on 
politico-religiosity in Turkey show that both Islam and right wing political values remain an 
integral part of Turkish people’s lives. I find that politico-religious values (a combined effect of 
importance of God, attendance at religious services, importance of religion, and holding right 
wing political values) have increased in Turkey, in line with the literature dealing with the 
mobilization of political Islam.  
Drawing from second demographic transition theory, I hypothesized that demographic 
attitudes will be positively associated with tolerance toward homosexuality. My results from the 
demography index indeed support this hypothesis for both 1990 and 2011 waves. A combined 
effect of justification of abortion and justification of divorce do lead to more tolerance toward 
both homosexual neighbors and justification of homosexuality (Hypothesis 1).  
When I examined the separate impact of each demography variable consistent with the 
second demographic transition theory on homosexuality, I found that justification of abortion is a 
significant predictor in both 1990 and 2011 for both dependent variables. Thus, I conclude that 
my hypothesis 1A is supported. As individuals’ justification abortion increases, their tolerance 
toward homosexuality also increases. But I found only partial support for hypothesis 1B. That is, 
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the independent variable justification of divorce only predicts justification of homosexuality in 
2011.  This shows that the variable justification of abortion is a stronger predictor than 
justification of divorce, explaining attitudes toward homosexuality. This may be because 
abortion is a more politicized and radical belief than divorce. Another reason may be due to the 
close relationship between tolerance of abortion and divorce. That is, those who tend to think 
abortion is justifiable may also agree that divorce is also justifiable. An analysis without 
including the variable of justification of abortion variable in the model shows that justification of 
divorce is a significant predictor of tolerance toward homosexuality, controlling for the other 
variables. However, the variable justification of divorce loses its significance once we add the 
variable justification of abortion into the model. Although these two variables may be related, 
my pre-analysis showed that they were not multicollinear. Thus, I included both variables in my 
analyses.  
While the second demographic transition theory suggests that importance of family 
would be an important predictor of tolerance toward homosexuality, my findings only partially 
support this hypothesis (Hypothesis 1C).  Importance of family only significantly decreases 
justification of homosexuality in 2011. This may be related to high levels of importance of 
family among Turkish respondents. Nearly 90 percent of individuals in 1990 and 97 percent of 
individuals in 2011 considered family as important in life. Thus, the variable importance of 
family does not have much explanatory power owing to its very small variance; that is, only a 
small fraction of individuals do not consider family to be important in life. 
Drawing from the literature on mobilization of political Islam, I hypothesized that 
politico-religious values will be inversely related to tolerance toward homosexuality (Hypothesis 
2). My findings examining the impact of politico-religiosity index on tolerance toward 
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homosexuality support this hypothesis. In both 1990 and 2011, higher politico-religious values 
were shown to lead to less tolerance toward homosexuality. Examining separately the impact of 
each politico-religiosity variable (left/right scale, attendance to religious services, importance of 
God, and importance of religion) on attitudes toward homosexuality, I found that the variable 
importance of God significantly reduces tolerance toward homosexuality, with the exception of 
tolerance toward homosexual neighbors in 2011 (Hypothesis 2C). Thus, my hypotheses 2C is 
mainly supported. Attendance at religious services was also shown to reduce justification of 
homosexuality in 1990, but not in 2011 (Hypothesis 2D). This might be related to the fact that 
attendance at religious services has decreased since the 1990s. Although the relationship was not 
shown to be significant in 1990, expressing more politically right-wing values become a 
significant predictor of tolerance of homosexuality in 2011 (Hypothesis 2A). Importance of 
religion also became a significant predictor in 2011, reducing tolerance toward homosexual 
neighbors (Hypothesis 2B). These findings may be associated with the fact that both the 
importance of religion and expressing right-wing attitudes have increased during the study 
period.  
Considering that politico-religiosity has been increasing in Turkey, I hypothesized that 
politico-religious values would override demographic values, with respect to explaining 
tolerance toward homosexuality in Turkey (Hypothesis 3). However, I found that this hypothesis 
was only partially supported. Results from the Pseudo R-squared values demonstrate that 
politico-religious values override demographic attitudes, predicting attitudes toward homosexual 
neighbors in 2011. On the other hand, demographic attitudes override politico-religious values, 
predicting justification of homosexuality in both 1990 and 2011. This may be due to the fact that 
politico-religiosity is more important for individuals when it involves people with whom they 
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would interact on a regular basis, such as neighbors. On the other hand, when individuals think 
about homosexuality in the abstract (i.e. whether it is justifiable), politico-religious values may 
not seem to be as important.  
My dissertation has important implications regarding same-sex sexuality in Turkey. As I 
previously mentioned in Chapter 1, we know very little about issues regarding same-sex 
sexuality in Muslim societies in general and in Turkish society in particular.  Moreover, what we 
do know is predominantly derived from qualitative inquiries, mainly because LGBT population 
are among the hard to reach populations. By producing results that are generalizable to the 
Turkish population, my dissertation fills an important regional and methodological gap in the 
literature.  
My findings demonstrate that Turkish people’s tolerance toward homosexuality have 
been stagnant compared to other European societies. This has major implications for those who 
identify, are attracted to, or are engaging in same-sex behavior. We know that intolerant views of 
homosexuality are associated with both violence and discrimination as well as depression and 
suicide for those who hold non-normative sexualities. Thus, an important question then becomes 
how do we increase the acceptance rates of homosexuality in Turkey? The answer to this 
question, though complex, is not an insoluble one. The “demographic metabolism,” the 
continuous dynamic process of demographic renewal of societies, makes value change possible 
(Ryder 1965).  Although stability is often considered as an institutional goal, the renowned (but 
now deceased) demographer Norman Ryder has argued that fertility and mortality make this idea 
of a stable society problematic. According to Ryder (1965:850) “the direction of the change may 
be to the left or to the right, toward democracy or toward totalitarianism, but whatever the trend, 
it is most manifest in youth.”  Thus, I would argue that we need to create effective ways to reach 
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Turkish youth and to break the taboos in the country’s societal institutions, mainly, the family, 
the education system, and the media, regarding sexuality issues, particularly same-sex sexuality. 
Moreover, it is incumbent on the Turkish government to implement policies that protect 
the rights of sexual minorities. While values certainly have a tremendous impact on changing 
government policy, government policies can play an equally integral role changing societal 
values. If the Turkish government can legally prevent discrimination against sexual minorities, 
cultural values regarding the acceptance of homosexuality of the nation will also transform in the 
long term.  
My findings also show that increasing politico-religious values have been a key factor, 
blocking Turkish culture’s progress, regarding the acceptance of homosexuality. This finding, 
however, should not be misinterpreted as Islam being the root cause of intolerance of 
homosexuality. In fact, when we analyze the Qur’an, or the Sharia, we find neither a position on 
homosexual desire nor a condemnation of homosexuality. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, just as 
was the situation in ancient Athens, homoerotic relationships were quite common among 
classical Muslim scholars (Daniyal 2016).  Thus, we can say that condemnation of 
homosexuality is cultural; it differs greatly from society to society and by time period. As a 
society, we need to acknowledge the religious misinterpretation of Islamic texts regarding 
homosexuality and find ways the bridge the polarization between religious and secular 
individuals in Turkey.   
In the next section of this chapter, I discuss the limitations of my research before moving 
on to my future research agenda.  
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5.2. Limitations 
In this section, I address some of the limitations associated with my dissertation. One of 
the major limitations of my study has to do with the measurement of attitudes toward 
homosexuality. Unfortunately, most of the questions that measure attitudes toward 
homosexuality lack significant depth by not differentiating between homosexual attraction, 
identification, and behavior. Research conducted on this topic by demography of sexuality 
scholars shows that the type of measure we use to measure sexual orientation is crucial for 
understanding same-sex sexuality (Bogaert 2006). However, the data I used did not allow me to 
analyze these three dimensions of sexuality. Secondly, the questions I used also do not 
differentiate between male and female homosexuality.  In the case of Turkey, female 
homosexuality is often not considered legitimate. Accordingly, it is possible that this question 
may be over measuring attitudes toward male homosexuality. Thirdly, another limitation is 
specifically related to the conceptualization of justification of homosexuality question. Rather 
than measuring acceptance of homosexuality, this question may be measuring homosexual acts 
that are conducted in a situation that can be excused rather than measuring acceptance of 
homosexuality. 
In addition, I was not able to control for urban and rural status in my analyses because 
unfortunately this variable was not included in the dataset. Lastly, I was only able to analyze 
attitudes in 1990 and in 2011. Contemporary reports show that the Turkish government’s civil 
rights violations have been on the rise. Consequently, it is possible that tolerance toward 
homosexuality has deteriorated since 2011. Once the new wave of the World Values Survey 
becomes available, a new investigation of the same-sex sexuality in Turkey will be warranted. 
Nonetheless, considering the lack of nationally representative datasets measuring same-sex 
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sexuality, I would argue that my findings provide crucial insights regarding Turkish individuals’ 
attitudes toward homosexuality. 
In the next section, I conclude my dissertation by answering the question, “where to go 
from here?” in a discussion of my future research plans and interests for the next several years.  
  
5.3. Future Research 
 
For the purposes of my dissertation, I solely examined attitudes toward homosexuality in 
Turkey but, in the future, I would like to undertake a more transnational analysis, regarding 
gender and sexuality issues. What are the processes which reinforce and perpetuate gender 
inequality and homophobia? How does Turkey show similarities or differences to other 
predominantly Muslim societies with regard to its attitudes toward women and sexual 
minorities? In what ways, does discourse on gender and sexuality inform us about the divisions 
in values between Western and Islamic populations?  These are important questions that I want 
to investigate in my future work. I am also interested in expanding my research to attitudes 
toward other minority groups, such as religious minorities, ethnic minorities, and migrants, and 
demonstrate and ascertain which minority groups are the most marginalized in Western and in 
non-Western populations. On a similar tangent, I also plan to explore the status of Muslim 
minorities in Europe, particularly Muslim women who veil. 
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5.4. Conclusions 
 
By testing two competing hypotheses, my dissertation has shown the importance 
demographic and politico-religious attitudes’ impact on values regarding homosexuality. I found 
that while demographic values, consistent with the second demographic transition theory, are 
positively associated with tolerance of homosexuality, politico-religious values are inversely 
related. I also found that individual effects of each predictor variable varied across time and type 
of homosexuality measure. Sexuality issues are complex in Turkey. This is particularly because 
Turkish culture has been under the influence of both Western and Eastern values. In this lens, my 
dissertation has contributed to better understanding of values regarding homosexuality in Turkish 
society.  
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